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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Social media use continues to grow exponentially among employees, 
and employers are struggling to draft policies that both effectively protect 
their business while not impinging upon employees’ rights to engage in 
protected concerted activities. 1  Numerous entities are articulating new 
standards to deal with the growing use of social media. 2  The General 
                                                 
 1  See infra text accompanying note 45 (detailing attempts by employers to draft 
policies that govern employees’ online conduct). 
 2  See infra text accompanying notes 30–31, 188–189, 195, 203–204, 210 
(explaining that the GC issued three memos analyzing social media specific cases, in addition 
to a memo focusing exclusively on social media policies. In addition, the Federal Trade 
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Counsel (GC) of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is taking an 
active interest in employees’ use of social media to discuss working 
conditions.3 The GC recently released three memoranda analyzing whether 
employees’ social media activities are protected concerted activity under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).4 In the most recent memo, the GC 
focused exclusively on social media policies.5 The GC analyzed overly broad 
policies attempting to address a variety of issues, including protected 
concerted activity, insider trading, and employer endorsements. 6 
Additionally, for the first time ever, the GC approved an entire social media 
policy as lawful and included a copy of the policy for employers.7 However, 
employers continue struggling to develop effective social media policies 
despite the availability of the GC’s advice memos.8 
In addition to the GC providing protection to employees’ online 
conduct, individual state legislation is also providing protection to employees 
who engage in social media activities. 9  Specific states have off-duty 
protection statutes providing protection to employees for off-duty conduct, 
and in 2013, several states enacted employment-specific social media 
legislation, while others continue work to enact similar legislation. 10 
Employers must also consider whether their business is located in a state 
requiring termination for good cause or having anti-bullying legislation.11 
Thus, the breadth of restrictions employers need to consider is quite broad 
                                                                                                                   
Commission issued new rules to regulate internet endorsements, and the FBI recently funded a 
dedicated task force to scour social media for insider trading violations). 
 3  See infra text accompanying notes 45–47 (discussing three memos published 
by the GC specifically focusing on the social media’s impact in the employment context). 
 4  See infra text accompanying notes 30–31, 188–189, 195 (discussing these three 
memos. The GC’s memo shows employers continue to struggle drafting lawful policy 
provisions because the GC’s memo dedicates 20 pages to analyzing unlawful policy 
provisions). 
 5  See infra text accompanying note 46 (explaining that the GC’s memo 
addressed only social media policies and whether the provisions were lawful or unlawful). 
 6  See infra text accompanying notes 57–66, 69–72, 84–92, 102–103, 106–109, 
122–127, 172–174, 177–181, 190–194, 198, 202, 209, 216–219 (providing the overly broad 
policy language embracing protected concerted activity and attempting to address insider 
trading, employer product, or service endorsements). 
 7  See infra text accompanying note 47 (detailing why the GC approved an entire 
social media policy and incorporating a copy of the approved policy). 
 8  See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that employers continue to 
struggle to draft lawful social media policies). 
 9  See infra text accompanying notes 227–229 (detailing the states with off-duty 
protection statutes or acts specifically addressing social media in the employment context). 
 10  See infra text accompanying notes 227–229 (discussing state off-duty 
protection statutes). 
 11  See infra text accompanying notes 231, 261 (explaining that Montana requires 
termination for good cause and other states have anti-bullying statutes). 
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and extends further than just the GC’s concerns for protected concerted 
activity.12 
This comment provides an in-depth analysis of the GC’s first 
approved social media policy in light of the GC’s recent application of labor 
laws to the social media policy context and other restrictions employers must 
consider when drafting a policy.13 This comment reviews both the approved 
policy and the GC’s analysis setting forth why he deemed it lawful, and 
describes why other policy provisions are lawful.14 Comparing the approved 
policy with other lawful policy provisions demonstrates that the GC 
consistently analyzes certain policy provisions and provides employers some 
reliable tools to use when drafting a social media policy.15 However, not all 
the approved policy provisions warranted the GC’s seal of approval.16 
Many of the approved policy provisions are inadequate because 
individual state legislation is not properly incorporated, and the GC’s 
inconsistency in evaluating specific social media policy provisions warrants 
consideration before implementation. 17  Additionally, the policy does not 
incorporate off-duty protection statutes or new legislation specifically 
governing social media in the employment context. 18  The GC is also 
inconsistent in his analysis of many policy provisions, including veiled 
threats against employees, provisions requiring honesty and accuracy, 
provisions encouraging employees to utilize internal procedures, and 
provisions attempting to limit discussions of confidential information in 
violation of insider trading regulations.19 The highlighted deficiencies are not 
without remedies, but require employers to engage in thoughtful, thorough 
consideration to cure the approved policy’s weaknesses.20 
                                                 
 12  See infra text accompanying notes 203–204, 227–231, 261 (describing 
additional FTC regulations, termination for good cause, anti-bullying statutes, and insider 
trading considerations employers need to consider). 
 13  See infra text accompanying notes 30–32, 44–45, 132–135 (detailing the old 
labor laws being applied in the social media context, both for protected concerted activity and 
employer surveillance). 
 14  See infra text accompanying notes 276–277, 281–282, 285–287, 291–292, 
298–306 (analyzing why additional provisions of the approved policy are lawful). 
 15  See infra text accompanying notes 66–68, 73–75, 278–295 (providing the 
analysis as to why the approved policy provisions are lawful). 
 16  See infra text accompanying notes 334, 337, 341, 347, 355 (arguing the GC 
should have invalidated some of the policy provisions because the provisions violate the GC’s 
general test for social media policies). 
 17  See infra text accompanying notes 314–325, 331–355 (describing the off-duty 
protection statutes, which the approved policy failed to incorporate, and the inconsistencies in 
the GC’s analysis). 
 18  See infra text accompanying notes 315–329 (describing off-duty protection 
statutes and recent social media legislation). 
 19  See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing the approved policy’s 
failures and inconsistencies). 
 20  See infra text accompanying note 274 (stating the approved policy’s 
deficiencies can be fixed by referring to the GC’s general test for social media policies). 
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 This comment provides solutions to the approved policy’s 
inadequacies and inconsistencies based on careful analysis of the GC’s 
policy provision evaluations and review of relevant case law and GC advice 
memos. 21   Employers must tailor their social media policies to their 
particular industry and use the approved policy only as a guide as its 
application is limited to a specific industry. 22  The GC provides reliable 
guidance to employers by consistently rejecting the use of a savings clause 
and consistently treating limiting language favorably. 23  Thus, when 
reviewing an employer’s policy, employers can reasonably infer the GC will 
favorably view use of limiting language and absence of a savings clause.24 
However, the GC’s inconsistency in evaluating specific policy provisions 
means employers must look to previous memos and the approved policy 
language to craft lawful policy provisions.25 Employers must also recognize 
that the approved policy does not reference all the important areas employers 
need to consider, such as off-duty protection statutes, recent social media 
legislation, unlawful surveillance restrictions, and notifying employees of 
how the policy is monitored and enforced.26 The areas the policy fails to 
address warrant consideration and must be incorporated into an employer’s 
social media policy. 27  Finally, this comment encourages employers to 
conduct an investigation before terminating an employee for online conduct 
in violation of an employer’s social media policy because the employer risks 
liability for terminating an employee lawfully engaged in protected concerted 
activity.28 
The approved policy is an excellent resource for employers, but as 
this comment argues below, it can only serve as a template because the 
                                                 
 21  See infra text accompanying notes 360–362 (describing recommended changes 
employers must make to correct the deficiencies of the approved policy). 
 22  See infra text accompanying notes 364–368 (detailing why employers need to 
tailor the policy to their specific industry because this policy was drafted for a specific 
company within a specific industry). 
 23  See infra text accompanying notes 369–377 (analyzing the tests employers can 
reasonably rely on because the GC is consistent in its favorable treatment of limiting language 
and its rejection of a savings clause). 
 24  See infra text accompanying notes 369–373 (arguing the GC’s analysis of 
limiting language and absence of a savings clause are features employers can reasonably rely 
on when drafting a social media policy). 
 25  See infra text accompanying notes 374–390 (referring to the advice memos and 
previous policies to correct the errors of the approved policy when the GC is inconsistent in its 
analysis). 
 26  See infra text accompanying notes 314–330, 391–398, 403 (describing areas 
the approved policy fails to incorporate). 
 27  See supra note 26 and accompanying text (arguing the approved policy’s 
failures, in addition to omitted provisions, require employers to diligently correct the mistakes 
of the approved policy and draft additional provisions to ensure their policy is 
comprehensive). 
 28  See infra text accompanying notes 408–410 (recommending employers 
conduct an investigation before terminating an employee for violations of an employer’s 
social media policy). 
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interplay between social media, employers, and employees continues to 
grow, and many areas are left unaddressed. 29  Properly protecting an 
employer’s business through a valid social media policy, while recognizing 
employees’ lawful rights, requires a clear understanding of the current state 
of the law. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Protected Concerted Activity under Section 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) 
 
Employers must understand the history and interpretation of the 
NLRA in order to understand how the GC applies the law to social media. 
The history of employees engaging in concerted activity to improve their 
working conditions is extensive and ever-evolving, beginning with Section 7 
of the NLRA, which provides protection to employees engaging in concerted 
activities.30 NLRA gives employees the right to work in concert for mutual 
aid and protection to improve the terms and conditions of employment.31 
Employees’ guaranteed right to engage in concerted activities is protected 
from an employer’s interference, restraint, or coercion because the 
employer’s unlawful interference is an unfair labor practice.32 
In Meyers Industries v. NLRB, the NLRB created the Meyers test to 
define concerted activity, and the test is cited throughout the GC social 
media memos.33 The NLRB defined activity as concerted when an employee 
acts with the authority of other employees or on behalf of those employees, 
and the employee is not acting solely for himself.34 The NLRB reasoned that 
concerted activity included circumstances where individual employees seek 
to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action, including when employees 
                                                 
 29  See infra text accompanying notes 399–407 (describing areas of the law that 
are left unresolved). 
 30  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (providing that the 
NRLA covers employers whose business affects interstate commerce with the exception of 
agricultural and domestic workers, independent contractors, employees of a parent or a 
spouse, and supervisors). 
 31  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to engage in . . . 
concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”). 
 32  29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006). 
 33  See Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to All 
Reg’l Dirs., Officers-In-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum 12–31, Report of the 
Acting Gen. Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases (Jan. 24, 2012), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567 [hereinafter Jan. 2012 NLRB 
Memo]; Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to All Reg’l Dirs., 
Officers-In-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum 11–74, Report of the Acting Gen. 
Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases (Aug. 18, 2011), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743 [hereinafter Aug. 2011 NLRB 
Memo]. 
 34  Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 4. 
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discuss concerns together prior to any specific plan to engage in group 
action.35 The NLRB found an individual’s actions may receive protection 
under the NLRA if the employee can show the actions or concerns are the 
logical outgrowth of other employees’ apprehensions.36 However, the NLRB 
excludes protection under concerted activity when the individual acts for his 
or her own benefit.37   
Washington Aluminum Company changed labor relations and how 
employers responded to employee actions by expanding the NLRA to non-
union settings. 38  In Washington Aluminum Company, seven employees 
walked off the job because they could not work in the shop due to its cold 
temperature, and previous complaints to management had proved 
unsuccessful.39 The employees were discharged for violating the company 
policy that forbade leaving the shop without permission.40 The Court found 
the employees engaged in concerted activity because they worked together to 
improve their working conditions. 41  The Court reasoned the policy was 
unlawful because the policy prohibited employees from engaging in 
concerted activities to improve working conditions and violated the 
employees’ rights.42 The employees’ right to engage in protected concerted 
activity was of paramount importance because “[t]hey had no bargaining 
representative and, in fact, no representative of any kind to present their 
grievances to their employer. Under these circumstances, they had to speak 
for themselves as best they could.”43 The impact of Washington Aluminum 
Company expanded the NLRA’s coverage for employees’ protected 
concerted activities to include non-union settings, resulting in the NLRA’s 
application to unionized workplaces, workplaces engaged in a union 
campaign, and non-union workplaces.44  
                                                 
 35  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda 
Pate Jones, Reg’l Dir. of Region 27, Pub. Serv. Credit Union, No. 27-CA-21923, 2011 WL 
5822506, at 3 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document. 
aspx/09031d45806fc018 [hereinafter Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo]. 
 36  NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, 53 F.3d 261, 265 (1995). 
 37  Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo, supra note 35, at 4. 
 38  See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962); see also Robert 
Sprague, Facebook Meets The NLRB: Employee Online Communications And Unfair Labor 
Practices, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 959 (2012) [hereinafter Sprague, Employee Online 
Communications]; Ann C. McGinley & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel, Beyond the Water 
Cooler: Speech and the Workplace in an Era of Social Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
75, 88 (2012) (stating that many employers believe the NRLA only governs behavior in 
private unionized workplaces or workplaces in the midst of union drives). 
 39  Wash. Aluminum Co.. 370 U.S. at 10–11. The employees worked in the shop 
producing aluminum products. The shop was not insulated and the only source of heat was an 
oil furnace in the adjoining building. On the day in question, the oil furnace was broken and 
the temperatures were 11 degrees with a high of 22 with unusually high winds. Id. 
 40  Id. at 16. 
 41  Id. at 14. 
 42  Id. at 14–15. 
 43  Id. at 14. 
 44  McGinley & McGinley-Stempel, supra note 38, at 88. 
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The GC applies the NLRB’s protected concerted activity precedent 
to the social media context and periodically issues summary memoranda of 
the cases the GC reviews.45 The GC recently released a memo specifically 
analyzing six unlawful social media policy provisions and detailing why the 
policy provisions are overly broad.46 The GC also analyzed Wal-Mart’s (a 
national corporation) social media policy and concluded all its provisions 
were lawful.47 The approved policy acts as a template for employers seeking 
to draft employment policies with lawful social media provisions; however, 
employers are encouraged to exercise great care in drafting a social media 
policy and to conduct an investigation into any employees’ conduct to 
determine whether the employees’ actions are protected concerted activity 
before concluding disciplinary action, including termination, is warranted.48 
 
B. The GC’s Tests for Lawful Social Media Policies 
 
Employers are encouraged to learn the contours of the term 
“concerted activity” to avoid drafting social media policies that ultimately 
                                                 
 45  See Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33; Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra 
note 33; Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to All Reg’l Dirs., 
Officers-In-Charge, and Resident Officers, Memorandum 12–59, Report of the Acting Gen. 
Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases (May 30, 2012), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd [hereinafter May 2012 NLRB 
Memo]; see also The General Counsel, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-
we-are/general-counsel (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (describing the GC as independent from the 
NLRB and acting as the agency’s top investigative and prosecutorial position which includes 
exercising supervisory authority over all the NLRB’s field offices. The GC guides policy by 
issuing complaints, seeking injunctions, and enforcing the Board’s decisions). 
 46  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 2–20; see also Kevin Bogardus, 
Obama Nominates NLRB Members Who Were Ruled Invalid in Court, (Feb. 13, 2013, 12:47 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1007-other/282833-obama-re-nominates-nlrb-
members-who-were-ruled-invalid-in-court (stating that the D.C. Circuit Court invalidated 
Obama’s recess appointments to the NLRB, and stating lawmakers are challenging the 
NLRB’s decisions since January 2012, including the social media memo with the approved 
policy provision. Whether the social media memo will survive the challenge or whether the 
decisions will be adopted by the new appointees is unknown). 
 47  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 20–24; see also Advice 
Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Chip Harrell, Reg’l Dir. of 
Region 11, Walmart, No. 11-CA-067171, at 1 (May 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/11-CA-067171.  
 48  Ariana Green, Using Social Networking To Discuss Work: NLRB Protection 
for Derogatory Employee Speech and Concerted Activity, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 837, 887 
(2012); see also Christopher J. Pyles, NLRB General Counsel Summarizes 3rd Social Media 
Guidance Memo, 17 No. 7 N.H. EMP. L. LETTER 1, 1 (2012) (reminding employers the 
approved policy is a helpful guide, but drafting a social media policy requires a great deal of 
care); Susan C. Hudson & Karla K. Roberts (Camp), Drafting and Implementing an Effective 
Social Media Policy, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 767, 795 (2012) (stating an employer must 
take the time to investigate any alleged violations of a social media policy). 
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violate employees’ rights to engage in such activity.49 Employers must also 
learn the GC’s test for determining whether a policy provision violates 
employee rights. 50  The GC applies a two-prong inquiry when reviewing 
employers’ social media policies.51 Under the first prong of the inquiry, the 
GC evaluates whether the provision explicitly restricts protected concerted 
activities.52 If the policy expressly restricts protected concerted activities, the 
policy is invalid. The second prong of the inquiry is reached if the provision 
does not explicitly restrict the activities but: (1) employees may reasonably 
construe the language to prohibit protected concerted activity; (2) the rule 
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule was applied to 
restrict the exercise of concerted activity.53 The GC deems a policy unlawful, 
under the second prong of the inquiry, when the ambiguous language may 
reasonably be construed to prohibit protected concerted activity because it is 
not clarified by sufficiently limiting language.54 Using the two-prong inquiry, 
the GC found an entire social media policy lawful because it did not 
explicitly restrict concerted activities and, according to the GC, was written 
in such a way that employees would not reasonably construe the policy 
language to include protected concerted activity.55 
 
C. The GC’s Approved Policy Addresses Many Inadequacies of Previously 
Invalidated Provisions. 
 
The GC’s approved policy attempts to address inadequacies of 
employers’ invalid social media policies. 56  The policy begins with a 
“guidelines” section to notify employees that engaging in any conduct 
covered by the social media policy may result in disciplinary action or 
termination, provided the employee’s actions adversely affect the employee’s 
job performance, the performance of co-workers, or organizations or 
individuals affiliated with the employer.57 The policy goes on to include a 
“Be Respectful,” provision just like other policies have attempted to 
                                                 
 49  See Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 779–80 (stating public and private 
employers must grant unionized and non-unionized employees the unequivocal right to 
engage in concerted activity). 
 50  See id. at 780 (explaining that the GC released a memorandum detailing what 
the GC considered “protected concerted activity” in the social media context). 
 51  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 3. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 20. 
 56  Id. at 2. 
 57  See May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 22 (“Keep in mind that any of 
your conduct that adversely affects your job performance, the performance of fellow 
associates or otherwise adversely affects members, customers, suppliers, people who work on 
behalf of [Employer] or [Employer’s] legitimate business interests may result in disciplinary 
action up to and including termination.”). 
10
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/8
2013] WORKPLACE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES 527 
 
 
incorporate.58 The policy language requires employees to always be fair and 
courteous to fellow co-workers, customers, members, suppliers, or third-
parties working on behalf of the employer. 59   The policy language also 
encourages employees to utilize the open door policy to resolve work related 
disputes, but does not prevent employees from posting criticisms online; 
however, employees are precluded from posting criticisms or complaints in 
the form of statements, photographs, video, or audio that may be construed 
as malicious, obscene, threatening, intimidating, harassing, disparaging or 
defamatory to customers, co-workers, and third-parties working on behalf of 
the employer.60 The policy includes examples of offensive posts, such as 
“posts meant to intentionally harm someone’s reputation” and posts about a 
person’s sex, creed, religion, or disability that contribute to a hostile work 
environment.61 
The approved policy language also instructs employees to be 
completely accurate and honest when posting online. 62  For example, 
employees are required to always be honest and accurate when posting 
information or news, and quickly correct any mistakes. 63  In the same 
provision requiring honesty and accuracy, the employer reminds employees 
the internet archives almost everything, and therefore even deleted posts may 
be recovered. 64  Employees are further instructed never to post any 
information the employee knows to be false or misleading information about 
the employer, associates, or third-parties working on behalf of the 
employer.65  
                                                 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. at 22–23. The policy language states: 
[K]eep in mind that you are more likely to resolve work-related 
complaints by speaking directly with your co-workers or by utilizing our 
Open Door Policy than by posting complaints to a social media outlet. 
Nevertheless, if you decide to post complaints or criticism, avoid using 
statements, photographs, video or audio that reasonably could be viewed 
as malicious, obscene, threatening or intimidating, that disparage 
customers, members, associates or suppliers, or that might constitute 
harassment or bullying. 
Id. 
 61  See id. at 23 (“Examples of such conduct might include offensive posts meant 
to intentionally harm someone’s reputation or posts that could contribute to a hostile work 
environment on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion, or any other status protected by law 
or company policy.”). 
 62  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45 at 23. One policy provision heading is 
“Be Honest and Accurate.” Id. 
 63  See id. (“Make sure you are always honest and accurate when posting 
information or news, and if you make a mistake, correct it quickly.”). 
 64  See id. (“Remember that the Internet archives almost everything; therefore, 
even deleted postings can be 
searched.”). 
 65  See id. (“Never post any information or rumors that you know to be false about 
[Employer], fellow associates, members, customers, suppliers, people working on behalf of 
[Employer] or competitors.”). 
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The GC provided some guidance by explaining why the “Be 
Respectful” provision of the approved policy is lawful.66 First, the GC noted 
the “Be Respectful” provision could be overly broad, but did not violate the 
GC’s two-prong inquiry because the policy contained sufficiently limiting 
language to exclude protected concerted activity.67 Secondly, a reasonable 
employee is not likely to read the “Be Respectful” provision as interfering 
with protected concerted activity.68  
The GC’s analysis of the approved social media policy also 
addresses employers’ trade secret and confidential information concerns.69 
The approved policy requires employees maintain confidential or private 
information and trade secrets.70 In addition, the approved provision provides 
examples of trade secrets and additional information that an employee may 
not post.71 The approved policy also requires employees to respect financial 
disclosure laws and addresses recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
regulations.72 
The GC provides minimal guidance explaining why the trademark 
and confidential information provisions are lawful.73 First, the GC finds the 
trade secret policy provision lawful because employees do not have a 
protected right to disclose trade secrets. 74  Second, the GC found 
                                                 
 66  See id. at 20 (“[W]e concluded the Employer’s revised social media policy is 
not ambiguous because it provides sufficient examples of prohibited conduct . . . .”). 
 67  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 20. 
 68  See id. (“In certain contexts the rule’s exhortation to be respectful and ‘fair and 
courteous’ in the posting of comments, complaints, photographs, or videos could be overly 
broad. The rule, however, provides sufficient examples of plainly egregious so that employees 
would not reasonably construe the rule to prohibit [protected concerted activity].”). 
 69  See id. at 23 (describing the heading of the policy provision “Post Only 
Appropriate and Respectful Content”). 
 70  See id. (“Maintain the confidentiality of [Employer] trade secrets and private or 
confidential information.”). 
 71  See id. (“Trade secrets may include information regarding the development of 
systems, processes, products, know-how, and technology. Do not post internal reports, 
policies, procedures or other internal business-related confidential communications.”). 
 72  See id. (“It is illegal to communicate or give a ‘tip’ on inside information to 
others so that they may buy or sell stocks or securities. Such online conduct may also violate 
the Insider Trading Policy.”). The provision further states:  
Do not create a link from your blog, website or other social networking 
site to a [Employer] website without first identifying yourself as a 
[Employer] associate. Express only your personal opinions. Never 
represent yourself as a spokesperson for [Employer]. If [Employer] is a 
subject of the content you are creating, be clear and open about the fact 
that you are an associate and make it clear that your views do not 
represent those of [Employer] . . . . If you do publish a blog or a post 
online related to the work you do or subjects associated with [Employer], 
make it clear that you are not speaking on behalf of [Employer]. It is best 
to include a disclaimer such as “The postings on this site are my own and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of [Employer].” 
May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 23. 
 73  Id. at 20.  
 74  Id. 
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“confidential information” is accompanied by sufficiently limiting examples 
to exclude protected concerted activity.75 
The GC does not provide any guidance regarding why the complete 
restriction on social media at work is lawful. 76  The employer explicitly 
prohibits employees from using social media during work time or on work 
equipment without authorization.77 The employer also prohibits employees 
from using work email addresses to register for personal social media use.78 
Until the GC provides firm policy guidance on this issue, employers may 
have to rely on the sparse case law and scholarly commentary.79 
 
D. Unlawful Social Media Policy Provisions Prompting the Release of an 
Approved Policy for Guidance 
 
The GC issued two previous summary memoranda including 
discussions of social media cases and social media policies.80 The memos 
show a pattern of repeated failures by employers to draft lawful policy 
                                                 
 75  Id.  
 76  See id. at 23 (providing no guidance in the “Using Social Media At Work” 
provision). 
 77  See id. (“Refrain from using social media while on work time or on equipment 
we provide, unless it is work-related as authorized by your manager or consistent with the 
Company Equipment Policy.”). 
 78  See May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 23 (“Do not use [Employer] 
email addresses to register on social networks, blogs or other online tools utilized for personal 
use.”). 
 79  See Hudson & Roberts 774–76 (providing and discussing four options for 
employers when regulating social media use); Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social 
Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 34 (2011) [hereinafter Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks] 
(suggesting employers regulate and monitor employees’ work-related online conduct); see 
also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (stating a clearly communicated 
policy will help define an employee’s reasonable expectations of privacy when it comes to 
monitoring communication activity); Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 
660 (2010) (examining the reasonable expectations of non-governmental employees when 
determining whether a former a non-governmental employee exchanged emails with her 
attorney on a work laptop about a discrimination lawsuit. The court noted that the 4th 
Amendment search and seizure “reasonable expectation of privacy” does not apply to non-
governmental employees, but stated that common law reasonable expectations of privacy with 
regard to attorney-client privilege were applicable); but see Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, 
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1109–11 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (declining to follow Stengart when a 
non-governmental employee claimed a reasonable expectation of privacy for attorney-client 
communications saved and emails sent on a company laptop. The employer’s policy was 
broad and applied to all resources used for electronic communications and reserved the 
company’s right to access, search, or disclose any file or stored communication. The 
employee’s communications were encompassed within the policy, and therefore the employee 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and waived his privilege with regard to the 
communications). 
 80  See generally Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33; Jan. 2012 NLRB 
Memo, supra note 33. 
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provisions with sufficiently limiting language to exclude protected concerted 
activity.81 
 
1. Overly Broad Policy Provisions Deemed Invalid for Lack of Sufficiently 
Limiting Language 
 
There are several instances where the GC declares employment 
policies invalid when social media provisions explicitly restrict protected 
concerted activity. 82  For example, the GC found the following policy 
language unlawful: “Don’t release confidential guest, team member or 
company information.”83 The GC found the language explicitly prohibited 
protected concerted activity because a reasonable employee might interpret 
the language as preventing a discussion about employment terms and 
conditions with other employees.84 The GC also invalidated a provision for 
encouraging employees to use internal procedures, rather than social media, 
to resolve their disputes.85 The GC reasoned an employer may suggest an 
employee utilize internal procedures to address work conditions; however, 
telling employees to utilize internal procedures will likely preclude, or at 
least inhibit, employees from engaging in protected activity in alternative 
forums like social media.86 In both instances, the GC used the first prong of 
the test to determine the policy explicitly restricted protected concerted 
activity and struck down the policy as invalid.87 
                                                 
 81  See generally Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 34; May 2012 NLRB Memo, 
supra note 45 (describing various unlawful and lawful social media policy provisions). 
 82  See Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33; Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra 
note 33; May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45. 
 83  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 4. 
 84  Id.; see also Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 13 (declaring a policy 
provision unlawful because it failed to use sufficiently limiting language or specific examples 
in defining confidential, material, or nonpublic information); Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra 
note 33, at 20 (failing provide sufficiently limiting language for “confidential, company, or 
team-member information” to exclude protected concerted activity). 
 85  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 11. 
You are encouraged to resolve concerns about work by speaking with co-
workers, supervisors, or managers. [Employer] believes that individuals 
are more likely to resolve concerns about work by speaking directly with 
co-workers, supervisors or other management-level personnel than by 
posting complaints on the Internet.[Employer] encourages employees 
and other contingent resources to consider using available internal 
resources, rather than social media or other online forums, to resolve 
these types of concerns. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 86  Id. 
 87  See id. (stating the rule had the probable effect of precluding or inhibiting 
protected concerted activity. The GC did not discuss whether a reasonable employee may 
construe the provision as encompassing protected activity, which is the second step of the 
GC’s test for social media policies). 
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The GC also provided an example of an invalid, overly broad social 
media policy provision that employees might reasonably interpret as 
prohibiting protected concerted activity.88 The policy provision attempted to 
limit sharing confidential information.89  The policy stated:  
 
You also need to protect confidential information when you 
communicate it . . . You should never share confidential 
information with another team member unless they have a 
need to know the information to do their job . . . Don’t have 
conversations regarding confidential information in the 
Breakroom or in any other open area. Never discuss 
confidential information at home or in public areas.90 
 
The policy language is invalid because employees might reasonably interpret 
the provision as restricting employee discussions about the terms and 
conditions of employment at home, in the break room, or in other public 
places. 91  As such, policy language attempting to limit discussions about 
employment terms does not contain sufficiently limiting language and is 
declared invalid.92  
Even when employers attempt to use limiting language to exclude 
protected concerted activity, the GC may decide the qualifying language fails 
to exclude protected concerted activity because a reasonable employee may 
construe it to include discussions about the terms and conditions of 
employment.93 The unlawful policy provision qualified the terms “material 
non-public information” and “confidential or proprietary information” as 
“company performance, contracts, customer wins or losses, customer plans, 
maintenance, shutdowns, work stoppages, cost increases, customer news or 
business related travel plans or schedules.”94 The GC first concluded the 
terms “material non-public information” and “confidential or proprietary 
information” were too vague, and an employee may reasonably construe the 
language as encompassing protected concerted activity. 95  The GC then 
moved on to the limiting language and concluded all the terms may 
reasonably encompass protected concerted activity because information 
about company performance, cost increases, and customer wins or losses is 
potentially relevant in union negotiations for employees’ wages and 
benefits. 96  The limiting language about contracts, without sufficient 
                                                 
 88  Id. at 4–5. 
 89  Id. 
 90  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 4. 
 91  Id. at 5. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 12. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. at 13. 
 96  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 13. 
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clarification, can also be reasonably interpreted to include union contracts.97 
Therefore, the entire policy provision, even with limiting language, fails 
because the terms lack enough clarity to prevent an employee from 
reasonably construing the terms to include protected concerted activity.98  
The GC also declared policies requiring complete accuracy in online 
posts unlawful because such a requirement is overly broad and fails to 
protect employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity. 99 
Requiring accuracy in online posts may reasonably relate to employees’ 
discussion of an employer’s labor policies and an employer’s treatment of 
employees.100 For example, the GC found a motor vehicle manufacturer’s 
social media policy to be overly broad where the policy stated, “you must 
also be sure that your posts are completely accurate and not misleading.”101 
The GC reasoned that an employer’s policy requiring complete accuracy was 
unlawful for lack of limiting language excluding protected concerted activity 
and may reasonably be interpreted to include discussions about the terms and 
conditions of employment.102 Therefore, the GC found the policy provision 
overly broad because the policy language encompassed protected concerted 
activities.103 
 
2. Overly Broad Policies Preventing Employees From Posting Music, 
Photos, or Videos with an Employer’s Logo Violate Employees’ Rights to 
Engage in Protected Concerted Activity. 
 
The GC finds employment policies unlawful when an employee may 
reasonably interpret the language to restrict the employee’s ability to post 
photos, music, or videos to the internet.104 For example, unlawful policies 
include those prohibiting employees from posting images, music, video, 
quotes, or the personal information of others without the owner’s consent 
and assurances the content may legally be shared.105 Unlawful policies also 
                                                 
 97  Id. at 12. 
 98  Id.  
 99  Id. at 6–7.  
 100  Id. at 6. 
 101  Id. 
 102  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 6–7. The NRLA does protect 
criticisms and discussions about an employer’s employment terms and conditions, but the 
NRLA does not extend protections to employees who post maliciously false information. Id. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. at 7; see also Jan 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 14 (describing an 
invalid policy prohibiting use of the company name or company logo without permission); 
Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 6, 22 (declaring a policy invalid for restricting 
employees from posting images depicting themselves and the company in any media, 
including the internet, in company uniform or corporate logo and declaring a policy 
prohibiting the posting of images with the company logo or company store).   
 105  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 7 (“The Employer’s policy also 
unlawfully prohibits employees from posting photos, music, videos, and the quotes and 
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include those forbidding employees from using an employer’s logos or 
trademarks. 106  Both provisions are unlawful because employees may 
interpret the provisions as prohibiting posting images or video of concerted 
activity.107 To illustrate, an employee may lawfully post photos or videos of 
co-workers with picket signs that contain an employer’s logo as protected 
concerted activity. 108  Thus, policy provisions preventing employees from 
posting images with an employer’s logo or trademark are invalid because 
they explicitly restrict an employee’s ability to engage in protected concerted 
activity.109 
Even though employers may have a proprietary interest in 
trademarks, the GC states that employers’ interests in trademark law are not 
impinged by an employee’s use of the logo in protected concerted activity, 
such as paper leaflets, cartoons, or picket signs protesting the employment 
terms and conditions.110 The GC declares employees’ non-commercial use of 
the logos or trademarks cannot be restricted in social media policies, 
reasoning the activity does not infringe on the employers’ interests.111 Thus, 
the GC finds the employers’ proprietary interests are not placed at risk by the 
employees’ non-commercial use of trademarks in connection with concerted 
activity.112 
 
3. The Use of a Savings Clause Will Not Cure a Policy’s Ambiguities. 
 
Many employer social media policies contain what has become 
known as a “savings clause.”113 In the employment context, a savings clause 
is a clause inserted into an employment policy for the purpose of curing 
ambiguities in the policy that may result from the intentional use of overly 
broad language or boilerplate language to correct unintentionally ambiguous 
language.114  Employers frequently phrase savings clauses to suggest that 
                                                                                                                   
personal information of others without obtaining the owner’s permission and ensuring that the 
content can be legally shared . . . .”). 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id.; see also Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 6, 22 (detailing an 
employee’s right to carry a picket sign with an employer’s name or wear a t-shirt portraying 
the employer’s logo in connection with a protest involving employment terms and conditions). 
 109  See Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 6, 22 (stating that the policy 
provisions violate Section 8(a)(1) of the NRLA because an employer is restricting the 
employees’ ability to engage in protected concerted activity). 
 110  Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 14 (explaining that employers’ 
interests in trademarks may include the good reputation associated with the mark, the public’s 
interest in not being misled as to the product’s source, or the employers’ interest in entering a 
related commercial field). 
 111  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 7. 
 112  Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 14. 
 113  See, e.g., id. at 8; May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 9. 
 114  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 9. 
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their policies are being administered in accordance with the NLRA. 115 
However, in reality, the policies may not align with the NLRA.116 In fact, the 
GC rejects employers’ use of savings clauses for two specific reasons. First, 
employees may refrain from engaging in protected concerted activity rather 
than determine if his or her conduct is covered.117 Second, the savings clause 
is an employer’s attempt to escape the consequences of an overly broad 
provision.118 
 
4. The GC Deems Employment Policies Requiring Respect and Prohibiting 
Disparaging Remarks as Overly Broad. 
 
Under the NLRA, employers may not restrain employees from 
discussing the terms and conditions of employment and overly broad policies 
are unlawful when reasonably interpreted to restrain an employee’s right to 
engage in protected concerted activity. 119  The GC deems employment 
policies requiring respect and prohibiting disparaging remarks as overly 
broad.120  An example of an overly broad social media policy prohibiting 
disparaging remarks includes the following language: “offensive, demeaning, 
abusive, or inappropriate remarks are as out of place online as they are 
offline, even if they are unintentional.”121 The GC reasoned the policy failed 
for over-breadth because the provision may reasonably be construed to 
encompass a broad range of communications, some of which may include 
protected criticisms of an employer’s labor policies or work conditions.122 
                                                 
 115  Id. The savings clause stated that the “[p]olicy will be administered in 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations (including Section 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act).” Id. 
 116  See id. (explaining that employers cannot rely on the savings clause to cure any 
ambiguities within the policy).  
 117  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle 
Kentov, Reg’l Dir. of Region 12, Flagler Hospital, No. 12-CA-27031, 2011 WL 5115074, at 
5 (May 10, 2011), available at http:// mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx 
/09031d45806bab9c. 
 118  See generally May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 9, 12 (rejecting two 
social media policies with savings clauses); Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 8 
(rejecting the use of a savings clause).  
 119  See Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 12 (describing as invalid a 
policy provision informing employees they are subject to discipline for inappropriate 
discussions about the company, management, and/or co-workers because the provision may 
restrict protected concerted activity). 
 120  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 8.  
 121  Id. See also Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 7–8 (declaring a policy 
invalid for requiring employees to discuss terms and conditions of employment in an 
appropriate manner, but failing to define appropriate with sufficiently limiting language or 
specific examples); Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 12 (declaring a provision 
invalid for prohibiting inappropriate discussions because it lacked sufficiently limiting 
language to exclude protected concerted activity). 
 122  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 8. 
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The GC also deems provisions requiring employees to adopt a 
friendly, professional tone while conversing online as overly broad because 
such provisions are reasonably construed to include protected concerted 
activity.123 For example, a policy was invalid because it instructed employees 
to stay away from objectionable or inflammatory statements, such as politics 
or religion.124 The GC analogized discussions about politics and religion to 
discussions about unionism or working conditions, finding both contain the 
same potential to become heated. 125  Preventing employees from posting 
objectionable or inflammatory comments may be construed to limit heated 
discussions about unionism or working conditions.126 The policy was also 
invalid because the provision did not contain sufficient examples of what 
types of communication constitute “objectionable” or “inflammatory,” and 
thus employees may reasonably have construed this provision to include 
protected concerted activities.127 
In addition to the policy language, the GC evaluates the context 
surrounding the conversation giving rise to the disparaging remarks to 
determine whether the employees’ conversation may reasonably encompass 
concerted activity. 128  For example, three hospital employees posted 
disparaging remarks regarding patients and the employees’ willingness to 
provide patient care. 129  The GC did not find the employees engaged in 
protected concerted activity, reasoning the postings were not related to 
employment terms and conditions because the employees suggested they 
may not provide appropriate care to the employer’s patients.130  
 
E.  Surveillance in Violation of the NLRA 
 
Under NLRA Section 8(a)(1), an employer must not give the 
impression it is engaging in surveillance of concerted activity because 
                                                 
 123  Id. at 10. One invalid provision stated “[a]dopt a friendly tone when engaging 
online. Don’t pick fights. . . . Remember to communicate in a professional tone. . . .” Id. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id.; see also Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel 
to Jonathan B. Kreisberg, Reg’l Dir. of Region 34, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., No. 34-
CA-12576, at 3–5, 9 (Oct. 5, 2010), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document. 
aspx/09031d458055b9c4 (stating an employee was denied union representation and later 
proceeded to call her boss a “dick” and a “scumbag “on Facebook and the GC found this 
concerted activity because it related to terms and conditions of employment). 
 126  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 10. 
 127  Id.  
 128  Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Director 
J. Michael Lightner, Reg’l Dir. of Region 22, MONOC, No. 22-CA-29008, et al., 2010 WL 
4685855, at 2 (May 5, 2010), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document. 
aspx/09031d45803f7e3b. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. at 5 (explaining some of the postings may have included protected activity, 
but the postings creating the grounds for termination did not relate to the terms and conditions 
of employment). 
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surveillance constitutes unlawful interference by preventing employees from 
feeling free to participate in union activities and causing employees to fear 
management is watching the employees’ activities. 131  An employee’s 
activities are under surveillance when the employer reveals specific 
information about protected concerted activity that is generally not known, 
and the employer does not reveal its source.132 However, no impression of 
surveillance is created when the employer explains the information came 
from a co-worker and was unsolicited by the employer.133  
Specific to the social media context, unlawful surveillance does not 
exist when an employer’s agent has been invited to observe an employee’s 
social media page, when the activities are not related to a union or for mutual 
aid and protection, and when the employer did not direct the surveillance or 
the employer did not make the surveillance its express purpose.134 Employer 
surveillance creates tension in its application to social media because more 
employees are “friending” or “connecting” with their bosses on Facebook, 
Twitter, and LinkedIn.135  Several cases address this tension. 
The GC’s Buel Advice Memo is one illustration of the tension 
between an employer’s alleged surveillance and the employee’s suggestion 
that he engaged in protected concerted activity.136 In the Buel Advice Memo, 
an employee truck driver was friends on Facebook with the employer’s 
operations manager.137 The employee’s Facebook post complained about one 
of the employer’s dispatcher’s unavailability and unresponsiveness to a road 
closure. 138  The employer’s operations manager commented on the 
employee’s Facebook post, triggering an exchange of comments between the 
employee and operations manager.139 The employee claimed that when he 
returned to work, he was stripped of his lead operations status and forced to 
resign. 140  The employee contended the employer engaged in unlawful 
surveillance by monitoring his Facebook page.141 
                                                 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. at 6. 
 134  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jane 
North, Acting Reg’l Dir. of Region 11, Buel, Inc., No. 11-CA-22936, 2011 WL 3793671, at 4 
(July 28, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45805fa7fc 
[hereinafter Buel Truck Memo]. 
 135  Sprague, Employee Online Communications, supra note 38, at 957 (suggesting 
that “the nature of social media technologies raises new issues of unlawful employer 
surveillance”). 
 136  Buel Truck Memo, supra note 134, at 2; see also Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, 
supra note 33, at 32. 
 137  Buel Truck Memo, supra note 134, at 2. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. 2–3. 
 141  Id. at 3. 
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The GC rejected the employee’s claim and found the employer did 
not engage in unlawful surveillance for three reasons.142 The GC did not find 
unlawful surveillance in this instance because when the employee “friended” 
his supervisor, he invited the operations manager to legally view his page, 
the employee’s posts were not union or concerted activity, and the employer 
did not request its operations manager to monitor the employee’s Facebook 
page.143  The GC’s memo suggests unlawful surveillance may occur if an 
employer is on Facebook, or directs an employee or an agent to use 
Facebook for the sole purpose of monitoring employees’ postings.144 
Another illustration of the tension between employer surveillance 
and protected concerted activity involved Intermountain Specialized Abuse 
and Treatment Center.145 The employee was a director and therapist at the 
Center and led group therapy discussions.146 In response to reports of poor 
performance, a supervisor announced at a staff meeting the employee was to 
be replaced by another therapist at specific therapy sessions.147 Following the 
meeting, the employee posted a status update on her Facebook page stating 
she hated staff meetings, prompting a co-worker to comment on her post.148 
Fellow co-workers subsequently reported the Facebook posts to 
management. 149  Several days later, and after additional reports of poor 
performance, the employee was discharged.150  The employee alleged the 
employer engaged in unlawful surveillance of her Facebook page in violation 
of her rights.151 The treatment facility responded by arguing the employer did 
not engage in unlawful surveillance because the employer’s determination to 
                                                 
 142  Id. 
 143  Buel Truck Memo, supra note 134, at 3–4 (stating there was no indication the 
employee’s gripes were a continuation of concerted activity or sought to induce or prepare for 
group action. The GC found the employee expressed his individual gripes and frustration). 
 144  Id. at 5.  
 145  Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Wanda 
Pate Jones, Reg’l Dir. of Region 27, Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Center, No. 
27-CA-065577, 2011 WL 6543306, at 1 (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb. 
gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458077b79d [hereinafter ISATC Memo]. The therapy center 
provides services to families, offenders, and others affected by domestic violence. Id. 
 146  Id. at 2. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. at 3. The employee posted, “I hate staff meeting [sic] at work. I feel like I'm 
taking crazy pills.” Id. Some co-workers “liked” the comment and the following conversation 
ensued with a co-worker:  
Co-worker: “Is this where we can complain about work? I was so fried 
yesterday . . . that I probably did not make sense.” 
Co-worker: “But I'll have what you're having.” 
Charging Party: “Yeah, I guess this is the place. You too? I'm done trying 
to understand our boss . . . And what is it we do for a living again?”  
Co-worker: “yeah the sooner you're done with that the better. We're 
therapists.” 
ISATC Memo, supra note 145, at 3. 
 149  Id.  
 150  Id. at 4. 
 151  Id. at 1. 
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terminate the employee could not reasonably have been construed to suggest 
the employee’s Facebook page was under surveillance.152  
The GC rejected the employee’s argument of unlawful surveillance 
because the Facebook posts were presented to management by a co-worker, 
and the posts did not involve concerted activity.153 Therefore, the employee’s 
termination was lawful and the employer did not engage in unlawful 
surveillance.154  
A third illustration involved the Public Service Credit Union.155 The 
employee was a member service representative and provided customer 
service to the credit union’s customers. 156  A customer approached the 
employee asking if he could change his PIN at the ATM; the employee 
replied it was not possible at that branch, but another ATM ten minutes away 
would allow the customer to change his PIN.157 The customer stated his 
intent to drive to Fort Collins, Colorado and asked if that Credit Union’s 
ATM would allow the customer to also change his PIN; the employee replied 
both ATMs allowed for a PIN change. 158  The employee’s supervisor 
approached him later in the day because the customer called complaining 
that the employee directed the customer to drive to Fort Collins and the 
supervisor requested the employee provide better customer service.159 The 
employee posted to his Facebook page a series of negative comments out of 
frustration with the customer and with regard to how the supervisor 
addressed the issue. 160  The employee was Facebook “friends” with nine 
workers and one supervisor, and his Facebook settings made his page only 
visible to his Facebook “friends.”161  Several days after the incident, the 
employee was called into a meeting with the Branch Manager and Human 
Resources Officer, and the employee was terminated. 162  The Human 
Resources Officer showed the employee copies of his Facebook posts but 
refused to identify how the employer received the information. 163  The 
employee claimed he was unlawfully discharged and that the employer 
engaged in unlawful surveillance.164 
                                                 
 152  See id. at 3 (stating the employer did not solicit the information). 
 153  Id. at 4–6 (stating the employee knew which co-worker presented her Facebook 
posts to management. The statements were personal gripes and did not indicate she sought to 
induce group action or change anything at work). 
 154  ISATC Memo, supra note 145, at 4–6. 
 155  Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo, supra note 35, at 1. 
 156  Id. at 1. 
 157  Id.  
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. at 1–2. 
 161  Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo, supra note 35, at 1. 
 162  Id. at 2. 
 163  Id.  
 164  Id. 
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The GC dismissed the employee’s complaint and concluded the 
employer did not engage in unlawful surveillance.165 The GC analogized this 
case to a previous case where it was found that an employer did not create 
the impression of surveillance when the employer mentioned a union website 
posting forwarded by an employee and the employer failed to disclose its 
source.166 In that case, the website was only accessible to other subscribers, 
so the employee could reason another subscriber provided the information to 
the employer rather than conclude that the employer had engaged in 
surveillance of the website.167 In the Credit Union case, the GC reasoned the 
employee’s Facebook postings were only visible to the employee’s Facebook 
“friends,” and therefore the information provided to the employer came from 
a “friend” rather than through surveillance of the employee’s Facebook 
page.168 Further, the GC dismissed the employer’s failure to identify the 
source because the employee’s privacy restrictions allowed the employee to 
reason (albeit correctly) that a “friend” supplied a copy of the posting.169 
Thus, an employer does not engage in unlawful surveillance and does not 
need to reveal its source when an employee’s Facebook privacy settings are 
restricted only to friends because the employee can reasonably conclude the 
information came from a friend rather than through an employer’s 
surveillance.170 
 
1. Invalid Social Media Policies Attempting to Incorporate Rules from 
Unlawful Surveillance Advice Memoranda 
 
The GC analyzed, and declared invalid, several specific provisions 
of social media policies that attempted to incorporate rules from the advice 
memoranda prohibiting employer surveillance.171 One policy the GC found 
unlawful specifically stated:  
 
[Employer], like other employers, is making internal social 
media tools available to share workplace information within 
[Employer]. All employees and representatives who use 
these social media tools must also adhere to the following: 
[r]eport any unusual or inappropriate internal social media 
activity to the system administrator.”172  
 
                                                 
 165  Id. at 1. 
 166  Id. at 4; see also Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1275–76 
(2005), enforced, 181 F. App'x 85 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 167  Public Service Credit Union Advice Memo, supra note 35, at 4. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. 
 171  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 6–8.  
 172  Id. at 8 (alterations in original). 
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The GC held the policy language was invalid for encouraging employees to 
report to management the union activity of other employees, even though the 
provision did not specifically authorize employees to engage in unlawful 
surveillance on behalf of the employer.173 The GC reasoned the language was 
unlawful because protected concerted activity was discouraged.174  
A second policy provision declared invalid by the GC required the 
employer’s permission before an employee posts a comment when the 
employee is unsure whether the post would violate the employer’s policy.175 
Even though the GC did not expressly find the employer’s provision violated 
the prohibition on employer surveillance, the GC invalidated the provision, 
reasoning that any provision requiring employees to obtain permission before 
engaging in protected activity is unlawful.176  
A third example of invalid policy language incorporating unlawful 
surveillance rules warns employees to “[t]hink carefully about ‘friending’ co-
workers . . .  on external social networking sites. Communications with co-
workers on such sites that would be inappropriate in the workplace are also 
inappropriate online, and what you say in your personal social media 
channels could become a concern in the workplace.”177 The GC reasoned the 
provision was unlawful because the language discouraged communications 
among co-workers and interfered with the employees’ right to engage in 
protected concerted activities.178 
The final example of an unlawful social media policy provision 
contained a veiled threat to employees.179 The policy provision instructed 
employees that internal consequences could result from a violation of the 
employer’s policies, and consequences could also occur externally with 
outside individuals or entities.180 The GC reasoned the social media language 
pertaining to internal and external consequences was unlawful because the 
provision discouraged online postings that could include protected concerted 
activities.181 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 173  Id. at 9. 
 174  Id. 
 175 Id. at 7. 
 176  Id. 
 177  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 8. 
 178  Id. at 8–9. 
 179  Id. at 11 (“Remember that there can be consequences to your actions in the 
social media world-both internally, if your comments violate [Employer] policies, and with 
outside individuals and/or entities.”). 
 180  Id.  
 181  Id. at 11–12. 
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2. Unresolved Issues Concerning an Employee’s Right to Privacy and an 
Employer’s Monitoring System 
 
Besides drafting lawful social media policies, one of the biggest 
concerns facing employers is enforcement of social media policies.182 Under 
the unlawful surveillance standard, an employer cannot monitor and enforce 
a policy for illegal or coercive purposes.183 However, what remains unclear is 
whether an employer engages in unlawful surveillance if an employee’s 
posts become available simply because the employer is a “friend-of-a-friend” 
of the employee on Facebook.184 Also, it is unclear whether the employer is 
monitoring concerted activity if the employer follows an employee on 
Twitter or learns of the information from an employee’s publicly visible 
account.185  Furthermore, the employer may only have a right to monitor 
activities for which the employee lacks a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.186  
 
F. Social Media Policies, Trade Secrets, Confidential Information and the 
NLRA 
 
The GC declares employees do not have a protected right to disclose 
trade secrets and confidential information.187 However, like the concerted 
activity provisions, the social media policy must contain sufficiently limiting 
language to ensure the provision cannot reasonably be construed to chill 
protected concerted activities, outlined by the GC’s test for ambiguity.188 
Such a provision may appear easy to draft, but the GC analyzed several 
policy provisions prohibiting disclosure of confidential information and 
found each provision unlawful.189 
For example, a policy forbidding employees from discussing any 
confidential information is overly broad and unlawful because the language 
may reasonably be construed to prohibit discussions about the terms and 
conditions of employment. 190  A provision stating “[d]on’t release 
confidential guest, team member, or company information” is unlawful 
                                                 
 182  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 793. 
 183  Id. at 794. 
 184  Sprague, Employee Online Communications, supra note 38, at 1009.   
 185  Id. at 1010–11. Robert Sprague suggests that an employer who purposefully 
follows an employee on Twitter is engaged in surveillance but this has not been expressly 
addressed by the GC. Id. 
 186  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 793. 
 187  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 20. 
 188  Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 12 (stating a policy provision 
incorporating both unprotected conduct (disclosure of trade secrets) and protected conduct 
(confidential information) without sufficiently limiting the language is unlawful for 
overbreadth). 
 189  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 4–7.   
 190  Id. at 4–5. 
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because the language can reasonably be construed to prohibit employees 
from discussing the terms and conditions of employment, which is 
considered protected concerted activity.191 The right to engage in concerted 
activity is protected by the NLRA, and without sufficiently limiting language 
to exclude protected concerted activities, the provision is overly broad and 
unlawful.192 
Another example of an invalid policy contained language allowing 
the release of confidential information on a need to know basis. 193  The 
provision stated, “You also need to protect confidential information when 
you communicate it. . . . Make sure someone needs to know. You should 
never share confidential information with another team member unless they 
have a need to know the information to do their job.”194 The GC found this 
provision unlawful, reasoning the provision prohibits employees from 
engaging in the employees’ right to discuss the terms and conditions of 
employment.195 
A third employer received partial approval from the GC for a 
provision restricting the release of trade secrets and confidential 
information.196 The policy stated:  
 
Respect all copyright and other intellectual property laws. 
For [Employer’s] protection as well as your own, it is critical 
that you show proper respect for the laws governing 
copyright, fair use of copyrighted material owned by others, 
trademarks and other intellectual property, including 
[Employer’s] own copyrights, trademarks and brands. Get 
permission before reusing others’ content or images.197 
 
The GC found part of the provision potentially lawful because the 
provision urged employees to respect pertinent copyright and intellectual 
property laws.198 However, the GC ultimately deemed the provision unlawful 
because requiring employees to seek permission may interfere with an 
employee’s right to take and post images of a picket line or video of 
employees working in unsafe conditions. 199  The employer’s permission 
requirement caused the GC to find the entire provision unlawful.200 
                                                 
 191  Id. at 4. 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. 
 195  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 5. 
 196  Id. at 10–11. 
 197  Id. (alterations in original). 
 198  Id. at 11. 
 199  Id.  
 200  Id. 
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Finally, the GC declared a policy provision unlawful because the 
term “material non-public information” was overly broad and vague.201 The 
GC deemed “material non-public information” overly broad; absent 
clarification, the term could reasonably be interpreted to restrict employees’ 
social media postings about employment terms and conditions.202   
Federal agents are reminding employers to consider financial 
disclosure laws and employers should anticipate developments in this area 
when reviewing social media policies. 203  The FBI announced a specific 
taskforce designed to search social media websites in an effort to ferret out 
insider trading violations.204 Present case law does not address whether a 
posting via social media qualifies as a whistleblower “report” under federal 
or state statutes.205 Absent clear guidance, employers should evaluate the 
employees’ statements and conduct a complete investigation to determine if 
the employees’ statements are covered under whistleblower or anti-
retaliation laws.206 
 
G.  Federal Trade Commission Rules, Social Media Policies, and Review 
by the GC 
 
The GC lends support to the FTC rules for employers’ product or 
services endorsements on the internet.207 Such inter-agency support is critical 
because employers risk liability for employees’ violations of the new FTC 
                                                 
 201  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45,Id. at 13. 
 202  See id. (stating that the provision is invalid because it contains examples such 
as company performance, cost increases, and customer wins or losses that may be relevant to 
collective bargaining negotiations and those examples encompass protected concerted 
activity). 
 203  See generally Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, FBI Uses Twitter, Social 
Media to Look for Securities Fraud, REUTERS, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/11/26/net-us-investment-summit-fbi-idUSBRE8AP0EX20121126?feedType= 
RSS&feedName=technologyNews&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=56505 
(stating the FBI views social media as a potential area for securities fraud and is dedicated to 
reviewing social media for violations).  
 204  Id. 
 205  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 796; see also Advice Memorandum From 
the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Ronald K. Hooks, Reg’l Dir. of Region 26, TAW, 
Inc., No. 26-CA-63082, at 1 (Nov. 22, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/ 
link/document.aspx/09031d4580755f55 (describing an employee post on Facebook alleging 
her employer was fraudulent in an audit and the employee was terminated for her social media 
statements. GC found the employee did not engage in concerted activity because she was 
informed the employer did not engage in fraud; yet, the employee refused to remove the 
posting). 
 206  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 796. 
 207  Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17–18 (describing a lawful policy 
provision prohibiting publishing of promotional conduct and stating it is lawful because 
includes preface and refers to FTC regulations); see also May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 
45, at 16. 
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rules.208 Employers must ensure employees receive proper notification in the 
social media policy detailing how to comply with the FTC guidelines, while 
simultaneously ensuring employees will not reasonably construe the policy 
language to include protected concerted activity.209  
The FTC’s revised rules for internet reviews are contained in the 
FTC’s Guide Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising.210 The new rules are intended to protect consumers by creating 
guidelines to distinguish employer product or service endorsements from 
consumer endorsements.211 Under the FTC’s new guidelines, an employer’s 
social media policy must explain how to adhere to the FTC’s new standards 
if an employee is using social media to endorse an employer’s products or 
services.212 The FTC requires an endorsement to “reflect the honest opinions, 
findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.”213 A lawful social media 
policy (according to the FTC) requires the employee to disclose any 
connection to the employer and use a clear and conspicuous disclaimer.214 
The FTC states both the endorser and employer risk liability if the FTC finds 
a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act guidelines.215 
The GC analyzed two policy provisions attempting to incorporate the 
new FTC endorsements, and the GC declared the provisions lawful, 
supporting the FTC’s goal of protecting consumers from misrepresented 
endorsements.216 The GC reviewed two provisions requiring employees to 
abide by the FTC regulations.217 The first policy provision stated: “Unless 
you are specifically authorized to do so, you may not: . . . [r]epresent any 
opinion or statement as the policy or view of the [Employer] or of any 
                                                 
 208  J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Endorsement and 
Testimonials Guide at the American Conference Institute’s Regulatory Summit for 
Advertisers and Marketers 2– 3 (June 25, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
speeches/rosch/090625roschendorsementspeech.pdf. 
 209  See generally Jan 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17–18, May 2012 
NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 16 (discussing two policy provisions addressing promotional 
concerns and attempting to draft the provisions in lawful ways so the provisions are not 
construed to include protected concerted activity). 
 210  16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2011). 
 211  Id.  
 212  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 787. 
 213  16 C.F.R. § 255.1 (2011). 
 214  See Rosch, supra note 208, at 5–6 (cautioning a blogger to fully disclose he 
received a system for free because generally readers will not expect the blogger received the 
system in exchange for a review and material relationships between the employer and 
endorser must be disclosed). 
 215  Id. at 2–3. 
 216  See Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17–18 (describing a policy 
provision prohibiting the publishing of promotional conduct that was found lawful because it 
included a preface and referred to the FTC regulations); May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 
45, at 16–17 (describing a policy provision requiring employees to use a disclaimer when 
posting about the employer as lawful because it protects the employer from unauthorized 
postings promoting its products or services). 
 217  May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 15–16. 
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individual in their capacity as an employee or otherwise on behalf of the 
[Employer].”218 The second provision stated: “Users may not post anything 
on the Internet in the name of [Employer] or in a manner that could 
reasonably be attributed to [Employer] without prior written permission from 
the President or the President’s designated agent.”219 
The GC found both provisions lawful because employees will not 
reasonably construe the provisions to limit comments about employee 
working conditions or employment.220 Further, the GC acknowledged that 
employers have a legitimate need for such a disclaimer to prevent 
unauthorized postings about its products or services.221 The GC’s finding 
provides support for the FTC’s goal of protecting consumers from 
misrepresented endorsements. 222  The GC allows social media policies to 
prohibit employees from making unauthorized posts about an employer’s 
products or services.223  
 
H. Define Use of Social Media During Work Hours 
 
Scholars strongly suggest employers’ policies should define the 
scope of social media during work hours and should notify employees 
regarding how the policy is enforced.224 An employer’s ability to monitor an 
employee’s personal social media use at work is subject to NLRA and off-
duty protection statutes.225  
Recent developments, outside the GC, suggest employee posts on 
social media websites may be protected from misuse by an employer’s 
monitoring system.226 Colorado, New York, and North Dakota have broad 
off-duty protection statutes that provide protection to employees for off-duty 
                                                 
 218  Id. at 16. 
 219  Id. at 15. 
 220  Id. at 15, 17; see also Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17 (finding a 
policy provision lawful when prohibiting employees from posting information related to 
“embargoed information” related to launch and release dates and pending reorganization 
because employees do not have a protected right to disclose). 
 221  See May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45, at 15, 17 (paraphrasing the two 
policy provisions as notifying employees that only officials designated by the employer have 
the authority to speak on behalf of the employer and explaining the GC’s decisions to declare 
both policy provisions lawful because employees will not reasonably construe the policy to 
prohibit concerted activity, but rather will interpret the language as prohibiting employees 
from falsely representing their employer). 
 222  See Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 33, at 17–18 (reasoning a policy 
provision is lawful for prohibiting publishing of promotional conduct because it includes a 
preface and refers to FTC regulations). 
 223  May 2012 Memo, supra note 45, at 15, 17. 
 224  See Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 774; Sprague, Invasion of the Social 
Networks, supra note 79, at 34 (suggesting employers regulate and monitor employees’ work-
related online conduct). 
 225  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 773. 
 226  See id. at 793 (explaining that courts are not tolerant of an employer’s use of a 
monitoring system to access employees’ personal social media absent a work related purpose). 
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activities.227 Generally, the courts in off-duty protection states do not provide 
clear guidance on the breadth or narrowness of some of the statutory terms 
when determining whether an employee’s actions are covered.228 Scholars 
                                                 
 227  Joseph Lipps, Note, State Lifestyle Statutes and the Blogosphere: Autonomy 
For Private Employees in the Internet Age, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 654 (2011); see also N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2009) (“It is the policy of this state to prohibit discrimination . . .  
with regard to marriage or public assistance, or participation in lawful activity off the 
employer’s premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential 
business-related interests of the employer.”); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(b) (McKinney 2009) 
(prohibiting discrimination for recreational purposes, which is defined as “any lawful, leisure-
time activity, for which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally 
engaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies, 
exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar material.”); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2010) (“It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee’s 
engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours . . . 
.”). 
 228 See Lipps, supra note 227, at 656–61 (2011) (explaining that the Colorado 
statute applies only to terminations but other state statutes embrace both terminations and 
disciplinary actions). North Dakota’s decision in Fatland v. Quaker State means decreasing 
goodwill may be covered by the statute and therefore the statute may be interpreted narrowly, 
but later North Dakota courts failed to affirmatively hold that an employee masturbating in a 
public stall was outside the confines of the off-duty protection statute, thus suggesting the 
court may take a broad view when interpreting the statute. Id. See also Marsh v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1461, 1464 (D. Colo. 1997) (when an employee sought relief 
after being terminated for writing a letter to the editor criticizing the employer’s hiring 
practices, the Colorado court interpreted “bona fide occupational requirement” to include a 
duty of loyalty and failed to provide the employee relief); Watson v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 
207 P.3d 860, 863–64 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008) (restricting the “duty of loyalty” to the facts in 
Marsh by indicating that no other Colorado court has followed Marsh’s decision, and by 
taking a broad view of the statute, finding it applied to all off-duty activities, even if related to 
work); Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F. 3d 1070, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 1995) (arguing that 
Fatland’s discussions about opening up a lube business represented a violation of Quaker’s 
policy requiring specific employees to disclose potential conflicts of interests with Quaker, 
and, as such, Fatland’s job of marketing Quaker’s products represented a conflict of interest 
even though the activities occurred after hours and Fatland was not protected by North 
Dakota’s off-duty protection statute); Kolb v. Camilleri, No. 02-CV-0117A(Sr), 2008 WL 
3049855, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) (concluding that picketing does not fall within the 
definition of “recreational activities” under the New York off-duty protection statute); 
McCavitt v. Swiss Reins Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2001) (McLaughlin, J., 
concurring) (suggesting the Judge believes the “recreational activities” should be construed 
broadly by stating “[i]t is repugnant to our most basic ideals in free society that an employer 
can destroy an individual’s livelihood on the basis of whom he is courting, without first 
having to establish that the employee’s relationship is adversely affecting the employer’s 
business interests”); State of New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 A.D.2d 150, 152–53 
(concluding that “dating” is not covered under  “recreational activities” in New York’s off-
duty protection statute); but see a dissenting opinion:  
In my view, given the fact that the Legislature's primary intent in enacting 
Labor Law § 201-d was to curtail employers' ability to discriminate on the 
basis of activities that are pursued outside of work hours, and that have no 
bearing on one's ability to perform one's job, and concomitantly to 
guarantee employees a certain degree of freedom to conduct their lives as 
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suggest employees may receive some protection for social networking 
activities, depending on how the courts interpret each individual statute.229 In 
addition, six states, California, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, and 
New Jersey, enacted legislation preventing an employer from requiring an 
employee to disclose their username or password to social media accounts.230 
There is no general protection for off-duty conduct except for specific states’ 
statutory provisions, and Montana’s requirement that employee termination 
be for good cause. 231  How the courts will address policy provisions 
incorporating termination for good cause, off-duty protection statutes, or 
social media legislation is unclear because the courts have not addressed any 
employer’s social media policy provisions applying a state’s employee 
protection statutes or the newly enacted social media legislation.232   
In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court followed Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion from a previous case to determine whether a 
government employer’s search of an employee’s pager messages was a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 233  The Court first evaluated the 
operational realities of the workplace in order to determine whether an 
employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated by an employer’s 
monitoring efforts. 234  The “operational realities” analysis included an 
evaluation of whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.235  If the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
Court moved to the second evaluation—the reasonableness under all the 
                                                                                                                   
they please during nonworking hours, the narrow interpretation adopted 
by the majority is indefensible. 
Wal-Mart Stores, 207 A.D.2d at 153 (Yesawich Jr., J., dissenting). 
 229  See Lipps, supra note 227, at 664 (stating that in Colorado, a court would likely 
find an employee’s blog or social networking activity is neither a conflict of interest nor 
related to employment responsibilities, but the future effect of the statute depends on whether 
there is still an implied “duty of loyalty.” In North Dakota, given the unwillingness of the 
Court to affirmatively hold masturbating in a private stall falls outside the confines of the off-
duty protection statute, a North Dakota court will likely protect less offensive acts like 
blogging or Facebook posts. Based on the New York courts’ analysis of off-duty protection 
statutes, it is possible that internet activities are covered by the statute’s term “hobbies,” but 
there exists disagreement in whether the courts should interpret the statute narrowly or 
broadly). 
 230  Employer Access to Social Media Username and Passwords: 2012 Legislation, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx [hereinafter Employer 
Access]. 
 231  Lipps, supra note 227, at 654–55; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903 (2009). 
Montana is the only state that requires termination for “good cause,” meaning a reasonable 
job-related dismissal for failure to satisfactorily perform job duties. Lipps, supra note 227, at 
649–50; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5). 
 232  See Lipps, supra note 227, at 649–53 (explaining that there is little precedent 
applying these statutes to internet activity); Employer Access, supra note 230 (explaining that 
the legislation was released in 2012 and only some states have enacted it). 
 233  City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010). 
 234  Id.  
 235  Id. 
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circumstances of the employer’s intrusion for non-investigatory, work-
related purposes, and investigations for work-related misconduct.236 
The Court went on to suggest the plurality opinion used to decide 
this case may not have been the correct approach, and the Court was 
reluctant to reach a broad holding implicating future cases that may not be 
decided.237 The Court further noted that many employers expect or at least 
tolerate personal internet use on employer equipment.238 The Court stated a 
clearly communicated, robust, and specific social media policy is a 
mechanism employers must use to confine employees’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy.239 
Scholars suggest governmental and non-governmental employers 
have the option to elect one of three provisions to satisfy the Quon test.240 
First, employers may elect to ban all personal use of social media during 
working hours.241 Employers face two challenges with an outright ban on 
social media.242 First, enforcing and monitoring a ban on social media is 
expensive. 243  Second, employers must prove to a court the operational 
realities of the workplace require that employees do not use social media at 
work.244 If the policy and the operational realities are inconsistent, employers 
risk the policy being nullified. 245  Some agencies and major companies 
                                                 
 236  Id. 
 237  Id. at 2630. The Court stated that, even if it was certain the plurality opinion 
was the correct approach, the Court cannot predict how employees’ privacy expectations will 
be shaped by changes in society and a broad holding may have unforeseen implications. Id. 
 238  Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2629. 
 239  See id. at 2630 (stating that clearly communicated policies related to electronic 
communications will help shape the reasonable expectations of government employees); see 
also Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 660 (2010) (looking at the 
reasonable expectations of non-governmental employees when determining whether a former 
a non-governmental employee exchanged emails with her attorney on a work laptop about a 
discrimination lawsuit. The court noted that the 4th Amendment search and seizure 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” does not apply to non-governmental employees, but 
common law reasonable expectations of privacy with regard to attorney-client privilege were 
applicable); but see Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1109–11 (W.D. 
Wash. 2011) (declining to follow Stengart when a non-governmental employee claimed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for attorney-client communications saved and emails sent 
on a company laptop. The employer’s policy was broad and applied to all resources used for 
electronic communications, and reserved the company’s right to access, search, or disclose 
any file or stored communication. The employee’s communications were encompassed within 
the policy, and therefore the employee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
waived the privilege with regard to the communications). 
 240  See Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 774–76 (describing three options 
employers may choose from). 
 241  Id. at 774. 
 242  See id. (stating the policy must be strictly enforced, the employer must strictly 
monitor employee use of social media, and employer must prove to the court it is within the 
operational realities of the workplace that employees do not use social media). 
 243  Id. 
 244  Id. 
 245  Id. at 773. 
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continue to ban social media use, although most employers have elected not 
to completely ban social media use in their social media policies.246  
The second option strikes a middle ground by allowing personal use 
of social media, but only at specific times and places.247 Allowing restricted 
use of social media reflects the actual use of personal social media by 
employees and attempts to balance it with the company’s legitimate business 
interests. 248  Cases reviewed by the GC indicate employees regularly use 
smartphones or other devices to access social media during work hours and 
suggest employers currently attempt to balance employees’ social media use 
by limiting the use to breaks.249 Companies allowing for restricted use of 
social media accept employees’ use of social media during working hours, 
but limit its use to breaks or prohibit its use during customer interactions.250 
The third option requires employers to allow employees unrestricted 
use of personal social media during work hours.251 Encouraging social media 
use is beneficial because of increased company exposure through employees’ 
posts, tweets, or other social media use (subject to FTC regulations), and 
allowing social media eliminates the expenses involved with implementing 
and monitoring a social media policy.252 However, by allowing unrestricted 
social media use during work hours, the employer risks the loss of employee 
productivity in the workplace.253 Additionally, failure to monitor employees’ 
social media use may expose the employer to liability, for example, if an 
employee fails to use a disclaimer for an FTC endorsement.254 
The GC has not specifically analyzed any policies restricting, 
prescribing, or prohibiting the personal use of social media during working 
                                                 
 246  See Lothar Determan, Social Media @ Work—Checklist for Global Business, 
BLOOMBERG SOC. MEDIA L. & POL’Y REP. (May 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
document/XLJOEFG5GVG0 (stating larger companies are banning social media at work).  
 247  Id. 
 248  Id. 
 249  See Advice Memorandum From the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to 
Wayne Gold, Reg’l Dir. of Region 5, Children’s National Medical Center, No. 05-CA-36658, 
2011 WL 6009620, at 1 (Nov. 14, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/ 
link/document.aspx/09031d45806fc01d (describing an employee using her iPhone during 
working hours to post a complaint about a co-worker); Jan. 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 
33, at 2 (describing an employee using her phone on her lunch break to post an expletive with 
the store name on Facebook). 
 250  See, e.g., Social Networking Policy and Guidelines, U. OF WASH. SCH. OF 
NURSING (Sept. 26, 2011), http://nursing.uw.edu/sites/default/files/files/SoN-Social-
Networking-Policy.pdf. 
 251  See Susan Rush, How Zappos Makes Social Media a Part of its Company 
Culture, SMARTBLOG ON SOC. MEDIA (Jan. 10, 2011), http://smartblogs.com/social-
media/2011/01/10/how-zappos-makes-social-media-a-part-of-its-company-culture (quoting a 
Zappos executive who stated, “[o]ur social media policy is be yourself and don’t be stupid”). 
 252  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 774. 
 253  Id. 
 254  Id. 
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hours.255 Scholars, however, continue to provide guidance for employers on 
this issue.256 Regardless of the policy adopted, employers must provide clear 
notice to employees specifying an employer’s stance on social media.257 The 
clear notice defines the employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy and 
an employee’s expectation is important because it is one of the factors a 
court may use to evaluate whether the employees’ rights are violated by an 
employer’s monitoring system. 258  The employer must also consistently 
monitor and enforce its policy to prevent courts from nullifying the policy’s 
enforcement.259  
Finally, employers are encouraged to notify employees that the same 
anti-harassment and anti-discrimination standards in the workplace apply to 
online conduct if it creates a hostile work environment, regardless of whether 
it occurred during working hours or off-duty.260 Many states are adopting 
statutes prohibiting specific types of conduct.261 Employers must remember 
these provisions are subject to employees’ rights to discuss employment 
terms and conditions until the GC analyzes a policy provision and provides 
more detailed guidance.262 
 
 
                                                 
 255  See generally Aug. 2011 NLRB Memo, supra note 33; Jan. 2012 NLRB 
Memo, supra note 33; May 2012 NLRB Memo, supra note 45. 
 256  See, e.g., Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 773– 76; Sprague, Invasion of 
the Social Networks, supra note 79, at 34. 
 257  See Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks, supra note 79, at 34 (stating an 
employee is on actual notice when an employee acknowledges receiving an employee manual 
with a clear provision stating the employer is monitoring computer activity). 
 258  See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (stating a clearly 
communicated policy will help shape an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 259  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 774– 75. The policy is only as good as its 
enforcement and failure to consistently enforce the policy may render it ineffective when the 
employer attempts to enforce it against a specific employee. Id. 
 260  See id. (stating the policy should include a provision prohibiting harassment 
and discrimination through social media when it creates a hostile work environment); see also 
Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 164 N.J. 38, 45 (2000) (holding the employer may be directly 
liable if the employer fails to remedy harassment of a co-worker after the employer was put on 
notice and the harassment was sufficiently connected to the workplace). 
 261  See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07(b)(3) (West 2011) (“A person 
commits an offense if the person sends an electronic mail, instant message, text message, or 
similar communication that references a name, domain address, phone number, or other item 
of identifying information belonging to any person . . . with the intent to harm or defraud any 
person”). Delaware also enacted a specific statute: 
A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or 
alarm another person . . . [that person] [c]ommunicates with a person by 
telephone, telegraph, mail or any other form of written or electronic 
communication in a manner which the person knows is likely to cause 
annoyance or alarm including, but not limited to, intrastate telephone calls 
initiated by vendors for the purpose of selling goods or services.  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(2) (2007). 
 262  Hudson & Roberts, supra note 48, at 778. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
 
The approved policy is a useful template for employers because 
many of its provisions consistently reflect the improvements from previous 
policies invalidated by the GC.263 The policy does not explicitly or implicitly 
restrict employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity because it 
allows employees to “friend” co-workers through social media, and 
employees may post images without obtaining employer approval first.264 In 
addition, the approved policy effectively utilizes sufficiently limiting 
language narrow enough to define specific categories of prohibited photos, 
statements, video, or audio, but broad enough so as not to limit protected 
concerted activity. 265  The approved policy provides helpful guidance to 
employers attempting to incorporate a lawful FTC provision because the 
policy language addresses FTC regulations and trademark provision 
concerns of the employers.266 However, some of the provisions within the 
approved policy warrant caution before implementation. 
Employers cannot automatically implement the approved policy 
without revisions because the GC is inconsistent in his analysis of numerous 
provisions.  The GC is inconsistent in his analysis and conclusions regarding 
specific policy provisions, such as financial disclosure provisions, accuracy 
in online provisions, veiled threat provisions, and internal procedure 
provisions. 267  The approved policy is also inadequate because it fails to 
notify employees regarding how the social media policy is monitored or 
enforced.268  For example, the approved policy may violate state off-duty 
protection statutes and new social media legislation.269 The inadequacies are 
not without remedies so long as the employer engages in thoughtful drafting 
of policy provisions.270 
                                                 
 263  See supra text accompanying notes 67–68, 72, 216–220 (describing the 
approved policy’s use of limiting language to exclude protected concerted activity and the 
approved policy’s FTC provision in comparison to previously reviewed FTC policies). 
 264  See supra text accompanying notes 59–61 (describing the approved policy’s 
“Be Respectful” provision, which encourages employees to utilize the open door policy but 
does not prohibit employees from using social media so long as postings are not egregious). 
 265  See supra text accompanying note 60 (providing the exact approved policy 
language, which states employees are precluded from posting videos, photographs, or audio 
that fits into specified categories). 
 266  See supra text accompanying notes 70–72 (providing the exact approved policy 
language for trademark and FTC provisions). 
 267  See supra notes 62–64, 75 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
approved policy language); but see supra text accompanying notes 83–84, 90–91, 93–98, 
180–181 (providing examples of provisions declared unlawful). 
 268  See supra text accompanying note 224 (explaining that employers should 
notify employees how their social media policy is enforced). 
 269  See supra text accompanying notes 227–230 (describing the states that enacted 
off-duty protection statutes and the states that recently enacted social media legislation). 
 270  See supra text accompanying note 48 (arguing the approved policy is a great 
template for employers, but employers must exercise great care when drafting the employer’s 
own policy). 
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The deficiencies of the approved policy are corrected after the policy 
is carefully tailored to an employer’s business. 271  Businesses need to 
determine if they operate in a state with off-duty protection statutes, social 
media statutes, or statutes limiting termination for good cause. 272  Next, 
employers must use limiting language and reject the use of a savings clause 
as boilerplate policy language because the GC is consistent in his analysis of 
limiting language and in rejecting the use of a savings clause, thus providing 
two assurances employers can rely on when drafting social media policy 
provisions.273 Finally, employers can overcome the GC’s inconsistencies in 
analysis and the overly broad provisions of the approved policy by testing a 
drafted policy against the GC’s general test for social media policies.274 
 
A. The Approved Policy Provision Satisfies the NLRA, Trademark, FTC, 
and Financial Disclosure Requirements. 
 
The GC provides some explanation describing why specific 
provisions of the approved policy are lawful, but further analysis proves 
additional approved policy provisions are valid.275 For example, many of the 
approved provisions do not chill protected concerted activity because 
communications about employment terms and conditions are not 
restricted. 276  In addition, the trademark and FTC provisions are lawful 
because the language of both approved policy provisions is consistent with 
the GC’s previous analysis of similar policy provisions.277 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 271  See supra text accompanying note 47 (stating the approved policy was drafted 
for Wal-Mart, a national corporation). 
 272  See supra text accompanying notes 227–230 (explaining the statutory purpose 
and providing citations to the exact statutory language). 
 273  See supra text accompanying notes 47, 113–118 (comparing the approved 
policy with the GC’s prior analysis on savings clauses); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 67–68, 75, 90–92, 94–98, 101–102, 120–127 (citing a variety of approved policy 
provisions and unlawful policy provisions and demonstrating the GC’s reliance on sufficiently 
limiting language to either approve the policy or declare the provision unlawful). 
 274  See supra text accompanying notes 51–53 (detailing the GC’s general test for 
social media policy provisions). 
 275  See supra text accompanying notes 67–68, 74–75 (detailing the GC’s analysis 
for finding specific provisions lawful). 
 276  See supra text accompanying note 275 (explaining the provisions contain 
sufficiently limiting language to exclude discussions about employment terms and conditions). 
 277  See supra text accompanying notes 69–72, 110–112, 216–223 (providing the 
approved policy language for the FTC and trademark provisions and comparing the text with 
that from previously lawful provisions). 
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1. The Approved Policy Does Not Explicitly Restrict Protected Concerted 
Activity and Contains Sufficiently Limiting Language to Exclude Protected 
Concerted Activities in the NLRA, FTC, and Trademark Provisions. 
 
Under the GC’s approved policy, employees are not prevented from 
representing themselves through protected concerted activity. 278  The 
approved policy is valid because the approved language uses sufficiently 
limiting language to ensure the policy does not embrace protected concerted 
activity, thereby curing the defects afflicting previous unlawful policies.279 
Previous policies have prevented co-workers from “friending” each other on 
Facebook, required an employer’s permission before posting, and prohibited 
employees from using social media to discuss the terms and conditions of 
employment.280 Unlike unlawful policy provisions that failed to use limiting 
language in provisions addressing images and video, the approved policy’s 
provisions successfully prohibit employees from posting specific categories 
of statements, photos, or videos by identifying that prohibited posts are those 
that are discriminatory, threatening, intimidating, or malicious.281 Thus, the 
provision clearly applies only to egregious conduct, such as malicious 
actions or threats of harm, making the approved policy superior to other 
unlawful policies.282  
The approved policy is superior because egregious conduct cannot 
reasonably be interpreted by employees to include a picket line or criticisms 
of the terms and conditions of employment.283 Egregious conduct describes a 
hostile work environment, not the types of activities employees intend to use 
to improve terms and conditions of employment. 284  Limiting language 
satisfying anti-bullying statutes requires employers to prohibit conduct 
intending to harm or create a hostile work environment, and the approved 
                                                 
 278  See supra text accompanying note 61, 67–68, 75 (detailing the limiting 
language of the approved policy). 
 279  See supra note 60 and accompanying text (providing the approved limited 
policy language); but see supra text accompanying notes 177–178, 180–181 (providing 
unlawful policy provisions). 
 280  See supra text accompanying notes 83, 86, 90–91, 177, 197, 199 (providing 
examples of unlawful policy provisions preventing discussions about protected concerted 
activity, requiring permission before a post, and discouraging employees from “friending” 
each other on Facebook). 
 281  See supra text accompanying notes 60, 67 (providing the approved limited 
policy language); but see supra text accompanying notes 104–109 (providing an example of 
an unlawful policy without sufficiently limiting language). 
 282  See supra text accompanying note 61 (describing what type of conduct falls 
within the provision). 
 283  See supra text accompanying note 61 (describing activity by employees that is 
egregious in the approved policy). 
 284  See supra text accompanying notes 61, 68 (stating the approved policy 
language and stating it is not unlawful because it describes egregious conduct). 
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policy effectively prohibits this type of conduct while preserving the 
employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity.285   
The GC also approved the policy because the policy does not rely on 
a “savings clause,” whereas other policies relied on the use of a savings 
clause to cure the provisions’ ambiguities.286 Instead, the approved policy 
relies on limiting language to cure its ambiguities, as required by the GC’s 
general test for social media policies.287 In addition, the approved policy is 
successful because it does not attempt to restrict the type of conversations in 
which employees may engage on the internet. 
The “Be Respectful” provision does not require a friendly tone or 
require employees to avoid picking fights, which is an improvement from 
previous unlawful policies. 288  Conversations about unionism have the 
potential to become heated and may require the use of an unfriendly tone, 
which is why it is necessary to have policy provisions that do not prohibit 
unfriendly tones.289 For example, referring to one’s boss as a “dick” and a 
“scumbag” qualifies as an unfriendly tone, but the GC deemed the discussion 
as lawful because it related to the terms and conditions of employment.290 
The risk that employees might construe the approved policy provision as 
preventing heated or unfriendly discussions about working conditions is 
minimal because the provision defines inappropriate postings as 
discriminatory, harassing, or intentionally malicious.291 These categories do 
not prevent employees from fighting about union activities or engaging in a 
heated discussion about the terms and conditions of employment because 
such discussions will generally fall short of discriminatory, harassing, or 
intentionally malicious standards.292  
The GC allows social media policies to prohibit employees from 
posting unauthorized statements on behalf of the employer, and that 
                                                 
 285  See supra text accompanying notes 61, 261 (comparing the policy language to 
the types of activities covered in anti-bullying statutes). 
 286  See supra text accompanying notes 115–118 (describing why savings clauses 
are invalid). 
 287  See supra text accompanying notes 53, 67–68, 75 (describing how limiting 
language is used in the approved policies). 
 288  See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (providing the exact language of 
the approved policy); see also supra text accompanying notes 124–126 (describing an 
unlawful policy reasonably construed to prevent heated discussions about unionism).  
 289  See supra text accompanying notes 124–126 (supplying the GC’s rationale for 
invalidating policy provisions precluding employees from engaging in heated discussions). 
 290  See supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting that these terms were lawful 
because they related to the terms and conditions of employment). 
 291  See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (providing the approved policy 
language); see also supra text accompanying notes 120–127 (illustrating how the limiting 
language operates in comparison to an overly broad policy). 
 292  See supra text accompanying notes 58–61 (providing the approved policy 
language); see also supra text accompanying notes 120–122 (describing why the GC 
invalidated a similar policy and applying that same analysis to the approved policy language). 
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prohibition is clearly articulated in the approved policy.293 For example, the 
GC concluded that a policy provision that restricted all employees from 
making statements on behalf of the employer was unlawful, and the 
approved policy incorporates language substantially similar to the lawful 
provisions.294 The approved policy satisfies the GC’s general test because the 
language cannot reasonably be construed to include protected concerted 
activity and the GC recognizes an employer’s legitimate interest in 
protecting against unauthorized postings on behalf of the employer.295 The 
provision is not at risk because the limiting language allows employees to 
create a blog or post related to working terms and conditions, provided the 
employees identify the statement as their own opinion and not on behalf of 
the employer. The approved policy language, like other previously lawful 
policies, clearly notifies employees they are not authorized to represent the 
employer and they may only make representations on personal interests. 
Thus, the provision effectively excludes protected concerted activity and 
protects against construing the language as interfering with an employee’s 
right to discuss employment terms and conditions.  
 
2. The Approved Policy Provision Addressing FTC Regulations and 
Trademark Provisions is Lawful Because the Policy Will Not Reasonably 
be Construed to Include Protected Concerted Activity. 
 
The GC acknowledges an employer’s legitimate need for 
disclaimers, like the one in the approved policy, to prevent unauthorized 
postings about products or services, provided the provision cannot 
reasonably be construed to encompass concerted activity. 296  The GC’s 
approved policy conforms with the FTC requirements because both the FTC 
and the approved policy recommend the use of a sample disclaimer and 
require the employee to only express her opinions and disclose the 
employee’s relationship to the employer.297 The FTC requires an employee 
to only express her personal opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences about 
an employer’s products or services, as opposed to representing the statement 
is on behalf of the employer or representing a neutral consumer, and the 
approved policy conforms to this requirement by requiring an employee’s 
                                                 
 293  See supra text accompanying note 221 (explaining employers have a legitimate 
need to prevent unauthorized postings). 
 294  See supra text accompanying notes 72, 221 (comparing the approved policy 
language with a paraphrased lawful policy provision). 
 295  See supra text accompanying note 221 (explaining why the GC approved 
policy language limiting unauthorized postings). 
 296  See supra text accompanying note 221 (stating the GC’s reasoning for 
approving the use of disclaimers). 
 297  See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining the new FTC 
requirements and providing the approved policy language). 
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post to reflect only her opinion.298 The FTC also requires an employee to 
disclose her connection to the employer because the FTC has an interest in 
protecting consumers from misrepresented endorsements of an employer’s 
products or services.299 The approved policy adequately addresses the FTC’s 
concerns by requiring an employee to disclose that she is the employer’s 
associate, effectively eliminating any concern an employee may misrepresent 
an endorsement of the employer’s products or services on a blog or other 
website.300 The FTC also requires a clear and conspicuous disclaimer and the 
approved policy mirrors this requirement by encouraging employees to use a 
disclaimer; it even provides a sample disclaimer to incorporate in an 
employee’s posting.301 Therefore, this policy effectively incorporates the new 
FTC standards by notifying the employee how to appropriately endorse the 
employer’s products and services on the internet and reduces the employer’s 
and the employee’s potential liability for unlawful FTC endorsements.302  
Unlike previous unlawful policies attempting to prohibit employees 
from posting trade secrets online, the approved policy effectively precludes 
employees from disclosing trade secrets and provides sufficiently limiting 
language to exclude protected concerted activity. 303  The GC recognizes 
employees do not have a right to disclose trade secrets, but policies aimed at 
preventing such disclosures have been invalidated for using overly broad 
language that encompasses protected concerted activity. 304  The approved 
policy remedies this problem by including sufficiently limiting language so 
as not to infringe on protected concerted activity.305 The approved policy’s 
use of sufficiently limiting language for trade secrets (development of 
systems, processes, products, know-how, and technology) warrants the GC’s 
support because it satisfies the second prong of the GC’s social media test by 
insuring employees cannot reasonably construe “trade secrets” to include 
protected concerted activity.306 Thus, the approved policy cures the defects of 
                                                 
 298  See supra notes 72, 213 and accompanying text (describing endorsement 
requirements). 
 299  See supra text accompanying note 214 (telling employees they must disclose 
their relationship to the employer). 
 300  See supra note 72 and accompanying text (showing that the approved policy 
language requires employees to disclose their relationship to the employer). 
 301  See supra notes 72, 214 and accompanying text (requiring employees to use a 
clear and conspicuous disclaimer to comply with FTC regulations and the approved policy 
also provides a disclaimer). 
 302  See supra text accompanying note 208 (explaining that the employer and the 
employee risk liability for an endorsement failing to meet the FTC guidelines). 
 303  See supra text accompanying notes 73–74, 187 (explaining that the GC 
declared employees do not have a right to disclose trade secrets) 
 304  See supra text accompanying note 187 (explaining the GC stated employees do 
not have a right to disclose trade secrets). 
 305  See supra text accompanying notes 73–74, 128 (comparing the GC’s previous 
analysis to the approved policy). 
 306  See supra text accompanying notes 53–54, 73–74 (referring to the GC’s social 
media test and comparing it to the approved policy language). 
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previous unlawful policies by relying on sufficiently limiting language to 
exclude protected concerted activity.  
 
B. The Approved Policy is Insufficient Because it Fails to Consider Off-
Duty Protection Statutes and New Social Media Legislation. In Addition, 
the Approved Policy is Insufficient Because it is an Unfair Labor Practice 
to Threaten Employees and Social Media Use is Expressly Prohibited 
Without Notification to Employees of How the Policy is Enforced. 
 
The GC’s approved social media policy fails to consider many 
important issues related to employers. First, the GC’s approved policy fails 
to recognize specific state statutes giving employees additional 
protections. 307  Second, the policy language contains a veiled threat to 
employees, which legitimate social media policies cannot do because so 
doing constitutes an unfair labor practice.308 Third, the GC is inconsistent in 
his analysis of specific policy provisions. 309  Finally, the policy fails to 
consider whether an absolute prohibition on social media is a workable 
standard.310  
 
1. The Approved Policy Violates Off-Duty Protection Statutes Because it 
Fails to Incorporate the Appropriate Standards. 
 
The approved policy violates off-duty protection statutes by 
threatening termination for lawful activities conducted off an employer’s 
premises and containing a lower standard justifying termination than the off-
duty statutes.311 The courts have not analyzed any provision attempting to 
incorporate off-duty protection statutes into the policy language, which is 
likely why the employer failed to incorporate similar provisions in the 
                                                 
 307  See supra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing the different off-duty 
protection statutes).  
 308  See supra text accompanying notes 32, 64 (stating it is an unfair labor practice 
to restrict or coerce employees in the exercise of protected concerted activity and providing 
the approved policy language acted as a veiled threat to employees by reminding employees 
the internet archives everything). 
 309  See supra text accompanying notes 64, 180–181 (providing the approved 
policy language in comparison to overly broad policy language acting as a threat to 
employees); see also supra text accompanying notes 63, 101–102 (comparing the approved 
policy language requiring complete accuracy in online posts with a previously invalidated 
policy); see also supra text accompanying notes 72, 190–202 (analyzing the approved policy 
language forbidding the release of confidential information in comparison to previously 
unlawful policies); see also supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (comparing the 
approved policy language to a provision previously deemed unlawful). 
 310  See supra text accompanying note 77 (explaining to employees that social 
media is prohibited at work). 
 311  See supra notes 57, 227–229 and accompanying text (arguing the sample 
policy language has a lower standard for termination and discipline than how the off-duty 
protection statutes have been interpreted). 
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approved policy.312 All off-duty protection statutes protect an employee’s 
conduct outside of work.313 If an employee is terminated or disciplined under 
the approved policy, the “adverse effect” language may conflict with 
Colorado, North Dakota, or New York’s off-duty protection statutes, which 
is why employers need to consider the statutes’ effect when drafting social 
media policies provisions.314  
For example, Colorado protects an employee from being fired so 
long as she is engaging in lawful activity during nonworking hours and off 
the premises of the employer, unless it is reasonably and rationally related to 
an employer’s business—but the approved policy does not adequately meet 
the requirements of Colorado’s statute.315 First, the approved policy threatens 
employees with either disciplinary action or termination for actions that 
adversely affect the employer, but the statute protects employees from 
termination and extends protection to all off-duty activities, even if related to 
work.316 Based on case law, scholars believe the Colorado courts will protect 
an employee’s off-duty social networking conduct because it is neither a 
conflict of interest nor related to employment responsibilities, whereas the 
approved policy restricts employees’ off-duty activities by threatening 
termination based solely on an “adverse effect.”317 Thus, the approved policy 
is overly broad in comparison to employees’ off-duty protections awarded 
under the statute because both the statute and the NLRA will protect the 
employees’ off-duty, work-related social media conduct so long as the 
activity is lawful or classified as protected concerted activity.  
North Dakota protects employees from termination or discipline 
when the employee engages in a lawful activity off an employer’s 
premises—but the approved policy infers a lower standard may be used to 
justify termination.318 An employee may be terminated or disciplined for 
lawful activity that has an “adverse effect” on a legitimate business interest 
under the approved policy, meaning an employee may be unlawfully 
terminated for actions protected by North Dakota’s statute. 319  Scholars 
                                                 
 312  See supra note 232 and accompanying text (explaining there is little precedent 
applying the statutes to policies). 
 313  See supra note 227 and accompanying text (providing examples of off-duty 
protection statutes). 
 314  See supra notes 57, 227 and accompanying text (describing statutes providing 
protection to employees outside the NRLA). 
 315  See supra note 227 and accompanying text (describing Colorado’s off-duty 
protection statute). 
 316  See supra notes 57, 228 and accompanying text (comparing the off-duty 
protection statute language to the approved policy provision requirement of “adverse effect”). 
 317  See supra notes 57, 229 and accompanying text (comparing commentary on the 
off-duty protection statute to the approved policy provision requirement of an “adverse 
effect”). 
 318  See supra notes 57, 227 and accompanying text (describing the statutory 
language of North Dakota’s off-duty protection statue and the approved policy language). 
 319  See supra notes 57, 227, 229 and accompanying text (comparing the approved 
policy provision language to North Dakota’s off-duty protection statutes and commentary on 
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suggest North Dakota’s broad view of lawful activity protects employee 
actions such as blogging and social media posts, and thus the approved 
policy’s view that any activity, including activity off the employer’s 
premises, which adversely affects the employer is too broad and embraces 
protected employee conduct.320   
Finally, the New York statute may be interpreted quite broadly to 
afford employees a wide breadth of protection, whereas the approved policy 
restricts employees’ protection from termination for online conduct. 321 
Although New York courts have interpreted the statute narrowly, at least two 
judges have concluded a narrow interpretation undermines the legislature’s 
intent, and the term “recreational activities” must be interpreted broadly.322 
The courts may interpret the statutory language to include employees’ 
blogging, Tweeting, or Facebook as “recreational activity” or a “hobby,” but 
the approved policy threatens either discipline or termination of an employee 
if an employee’s action has an adverse effect on the business.323 Therefore, 
the approved policy is flawed, as it may encompass a breadth of employee 
activity protected by New York’s off-duty protection statute. 324  Absent 
additional judicial interpretation broadening the term “recreational activities” 
or “hobby” to social media posts and employee termination, the approved 
policy language may reasonably include protected employee conduct.325   
Employers operating in states with off-duty protection statutes must 
ensure their social media policies do not impinge on employees’ protected 
concerted activity rights, and employees’ rights protected under the off-duty 
protection statutes.326 Thus, employers must not adopt the approved policy’s 
standard of “adverse effect” for determining whether to discipline or 
                                                                                                                   
how North Dakota courts may apply the off-duty protection statute in the social media 
context). 
 320  See supra notes 57, 228 and accompanying text (arguing the approved policy 
language is overly broad in comparison to the case law and providing scholarly commentary 
on North Dakota’s off-duty protection statute). 
 321  See supra note 227 and accompanying text (stating New York’s off-duty 
protection statute). 
 322  See supra notes 57, 228–229 and accompanying text (detailing the 
interpretations by the NY courts and the potential for the statutory terms to embrace social 
media activity). 
 323  See supra notes 57, 228–229 and accompanying text (arguing that the approved 
policy provision may not be overly broad in New York because both a concurrence and 
dissent suggested the off-duty protection statute must be interpreted broadly). 
 324  See supra notes 57, 228–229 and accompanying text (providing the approved 
policy language and describing disagreements among New York judges about the proper 
interpretation of New York’s off-duty protection statute). 
 325  See supra notes 228–229 and accompanying text (describing the different 
opinions of “recreational activities” and suggesting it may be extended to blogging because 
the terms have the potential to be interpreted broadly). 
 326  See supra notes 30–32, 227–228 and accompanying text (explaining off-duty 
protection statutes may provide additional protection to employees from an employer’s 
disciplinary or termination procedures for lawful activity conducted “off-the-clock,” in 
addition to the protections provided by the NRLA). 
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terminate an employee because so doing could cause an employer to run 
afoul of off-duty protection statutes. 
 
2. The Approved Policy May Also Violate New Statutes Specifically 
Governing Social Media. 
 
The off-duty protection statutes are not the only legislation providing 
employees protection; several states recently enacted legislation specifically 
addressing social media in the employment context, but the approved policy 
fails to recognize these advancements in the law. 327  California, Illinois, 
Maryland, and Michigan now forbid employers from requiring employees to 
provide employers with their social media usernames and passwords, but the 
approved policy fails to notify employees of their right to refuse to divulge 
their username and passwords.328 How the courts will interpret and apply 
these statutes to employees will certainly develop in the coming years.329 The 
approved policy fails to incorporate recent statutory enactments, and 
employers operating within states enacting social media specific statutes 
must ensure any social media policy does not violate employee rights 
protected by the statute.330 
 
3. The GC is Inconsistent in His Analysis and Conclusions about 
Provisions Containing Veiled Threats to Employees, Employers’ 
Requirement of Complete Honesty and Accuracy, Employers’ Limiting 
Language for Confidential Information, and Employers’ Encouragement 
to Employees to Use the Open Door Policy. 
 
The approved policy tells employees that the internet archives almost 
anything, which effectively threatens employees with a clear message that 
any activity can be retrieved and used as grounds for termination.331 The GC 
is inconsistent in evaluating veiled threats to employees because he found a 
policy similar to the approved provision unlawful.332 The unlawful policy 
                                                 
 327  See supra notes 230–233 and accompanying text (describing the states that 
recently enacted legislation and demonstrating the date of the approved policy was 2012). 
 328  See supra text accompanying note 230 (describing the states that recently 
enacted social media legislation). 
 329  See supra note 233 and accompanying text (stating the legislation was enacted 
in 2012). 
 330  See supra notes 230–233 and accompanying text (demonstrating the approved 
policy does not incorporate the recent social media legislation, and showing four states have 
enacted social media legislation, while other states are currently considering social media 
legislation). 
 331  See supra notes 57, 64 and accompanying text (showing that the approved 
policy guidelines clearly state employees are subject to termination or disciplinary action for 
violations of the policy and the approved policy later reminds employees the internet archives 
almost everything).  
 332  See supra text accompanying notes 64, 178–181 (providing an example of an 
unlawful policy provision in comparison to the approved policy provision). 
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also reminds employees there are consequences for social media activities 
when they violate the employer’s policies, and the approved policy uses 
similar threatening language when it states anything posted online in 
violation of the policy is retrievable, even if deleted.333 The GC found the 
unlawful provision chilled protected concerted activities, and the approved 
policy should be equally invalid because the approved policy explicitly 
discourages employees from engaging in protected concerted activity, and as 
such, violates the first prong of the GC’s social media test.334   
 Alternatively, the approved policy also fails under the second prong 
of the GC’s test because reasonable employees will construe the provision as 
limiting discussions about terms and conditions of employment by 
suggesting the employer may retrieve information without a report from a 
co-worker or without a specific invitation to view the information.335 The 
unlawful policy reminded employees that consequences could result from 
policy violations, and likewise, the approved policy suggests to employees 
that the employer can retrieve specific information about the employees 
without an invitation or revealing a source and with a result such as 
discipline or termination for violations. 336  The GC’s inconsistency in 
evaluating the validity of provisions sounding as veiled threats reduces the 
credibility of the GC’s decision in rendering this policy provision lawful.337 
Therefore, employers should not simply copy and paste the GC’s approved 
policy because it contains flaws that restrict employees’ rights to engage in 
protected concerted activity. 
The GC is also inconsistent in his evaluations and ultimate 
conclusions regarding provisions requiring complete honesty and accuracy in 
online posts.338 The GC held a provision unlawful for requiring employees to 
be completely honest and not misleading, and the approved policy contains 
similar language requiring the employees to always be honest and accurate 
                                                 
 333  See supra text accompanying notes 64, 180–181 (comparing the approved 
policy language to an unlawful policy provision reminding employees there are internal and 
external consequences for an employee’s behavior online). 
 334  See supra text accompanying notes 53, 64, 178–180 (analogizing the approved 
policy provision to an unlawful policy provision and comparing the approved policy provision 
to the general GC test). 
 335  See supra text accompanying notes 53, 64, 132–133, 142 (inferring from the 
GC’s general test for social media policy that the approved policy language may reasonably 
be construed to include unlawful surveillance activity). 
 336  See supra notes 64, 179 and accompanying text (stating the approved policy 
language, in comparison to the unlawful provision, and explaining that employers engage in 
unlawful surveillance by revealing specific information that is not generally known and the 
employer does not reveal its source.). 
 337  See supra notes 64, 179 and accompanying text (showing that the 
inconsistency between the outcome and the language of the two policies makes the GC’s 
analysis suspect). 
 338  See supra text accompanying notes 62–63, 101–102 (comparing the approved 
policy language with a policy provision the GC previously declared unlawful). 
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when posting information or news.339 The GC reasoned the unlawful policy 
was overly broad and encompassed protected concerted activity, whereas the 
GC failed to provide guidance as to why the approved policy was lawful.340 
The GC should have reasoned the approved policy was unlawful for the 
same reasons it deemed previous policies unlawful—employees may 
reasonably construe it as a limitation on discussions about the employer’s 
labor policies and its treatment of employees.341 Therefore, the approved 
policy provision is as overly broad as the unlawful policy, and employers 
should be aware of this.342 
The GC is also inconsistent in his analysis of the approved provision 
prohibiting the release of private or confidential information because the 
approved policy’s limiting language fails to exclude protected concerted 
activity.343 The GC typically invalidates social media provisions failing to 
use limiting language to define “confidential company” or “material” 
information because the terms are vague and can reasonably encompass 
protected concerted activity, but the approved policy is substantially similar 
to, if not worse than, the language used in provisions previously found 
unlawful. 344  The approved policy unsuccessfully attempts to qualify the 
vague term “confidential information” with limiting language by restricting 
the term to mean “internal reports, policies, procedures, or other internal 
business-related confidential communications,” but these terms are more 
vague than language previously invalidated by the GC. 345  The GC’s 
inconsistency is most apparent when comparing the two provisions’ limiting 
language because the unlawful provision is more precise, using terms like 
“company performance,” “cost increases,” and “customer wins,” while the 
approved policy’s language uses vague terms like  “internal reports,” 
                                                 
 339  See supra text accompanying notes 62–63, 101–102 (comparing the approved 
policy language with the unlawful policy language). 
 340  See supra text accompanying notes 45, 102 (providing the citation to the entire 
social media policy to demonstrate there is no analysis on why the policy provision is lawful; 
however, in the same memo the GC declared the policy provision invalid). 
 341  See supra text accompanying notes 53, 62–63, 102 (demonstrating the 
approved policy provision meets the GC’s second prong and, therefore, the same analysis 
applied to the unlawful provision should apply the approved provision).  
 342  See supra text accompanying notes 62–63, 101–102 (arguing the two policy 
provisions are sufficiently similar to warrant the same analysis and conclusion as the unlawful 
provision). 
 343  See supra text accompanying notes 68–71, 92–97, 190–202 (comparing the 
approved policy language with its limiting language to policy provisions the GC previously 
declared unlawful). 
 344  See supra text accompanying notes 70, 189–190, 194–195, 201–202 
(comparing the approved policy language of “confidential information” with previously 
invalidated provisions also using the term “confidential” or “material” information). 
 345  See supra note 71 and accompanying text (quoting the approved policy 
language); see supra text accompanying notes 94–98 (discussing a previously invalidated 
provision which attempted to use limiting language). 
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“policies,” and “procedures.”346 The GC should have concluded the approved 
policy provision’s limiting language embraces communications relevant to 
union negotiations; both provisions are reasonably construed to include 
protected concerted activity because the limiting language is overly broad.347 
The approved policy terms were so vague that they enveloped the unlawful 
policy terms, and therefore deserved the same conclusion the GC reached 
with regard to the unlawful provision: the limiting language is unlawful 
because it is relevant to union negotiations related to employees’ wages and 
benefits.348  
Furthermore, the GC previously struck down the term “contract” 
when it was used as limiting language for the term “confidential 
information,” but the GC found lawful the broad and vague term “internal 
business-related confidential communications” in the approved policy.349 The 
GC should have concluded the approved policy’s attempt at limiting 
language was invalid because, like the unlawful policy, “internal business 
communications” may include collective bargaining agreements. The GC is 
inconsistent in his evaluation of confidential information, especially when 
employers attempt to use limiting language.350 
Finally, the GC is inconsistent in his analysis and conclusion of 
provisions encouraging employees to utilize internal procedures rather than 
vent on social media websites.351 The GC came to inconsistent conclusions 
regarding the approved policy and an unlawful provision even though both 
provisions explicitly encouraged employees to resolve work-related disputes 
by working through internal resources rather than posting complaints on the 
internet.352  The GC reasoned the unlawful policy had the probable effect of 
precluding or inhibiting protected concerted activity, and the approved policy 
                                                 
 346  See supra text accompanying notes 71, 94–98 (arguing the GC’s analysis of the 
approved policy’s limiting language and the analysis applied to the unlawful limiting language 
warrants the conclusion the approved policy is unlawful). 
 347  See supra text accompanying notes 96–97 (explaining the GC’s analysis for 
invalidating the previous policy’s limiting language and arguing the same analysis should 
apply to the approved policy’s limiting language). 
 348  See supra text accompanying notes 71, 94–98 (comparing the GC’s analysis in 
the previous unlawful provision to the approved provision and concluding both should be 
unlawful). 
 349  See supra note 71 and accompanying text (quoting the approved policy 
language); see supra text accompanying note 95 (comparing the approved policy provision’s 
term to a previously invalidated term used in a provision’s limiting language). 
 350  See supra text accompanying notes 71, 94–98 (arguing the GC’s analysis is 
inconsistent because the approved and unlawful provisions are substantially similar). 
 351  See supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (comparing the approved 
policy provision to a previously invalidated provision encouraging employees to communicate 
with co-workers, supervisors, and managers rather than posting complaints on the internet). 
 352  See supra notes 60, 85–87 and accompanying text (showing that both the 
approved policy and an unlawful policy encouraged employees to utilize internal procedures 
to resolve work disputes, but the GC only invalidated one of the provisions). 
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has the same probable effect.353 In both instances the employer discourages 
the employee from posting work-related criticisms online, and both 
encourage the employee to use internal procedures for redress in work-
related disputes.354  In this case, the GC should have concluded the approved 
policy provision was invalid as a violation of the second prong of the GC’s 
test because the provision may reasonably be interpreted to include protected 
concerted activity.355 
 
4. The Approved Policy Bans Employees from Using Social Media During 
Work Without Notification of How the Policy is Enforced or Monitored. 
 
Finally, under the approved policy, the employees are completely 
banned from using social media without any notification of how the policy is 
monitored or enforced, which means the social media policy is not clear or 
robust enough to restrict employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy.356 
The approved policy language attempts to restrict employees’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy by expressly forbidding the use of social media 
during work hours, unless authorized by a manager. However, the policy 
language fails to notify the employee how the social media policy is 
monitored, and the employee may have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
until the employer provides notice that a monitoring system is in place.357 In 
addition, employees regularly use social media in today’s workplace by 
using their smartphone or other personal devices, making it unreasonable to 
completely ban social media use at a person’s place of employment.358 Thus, 
unless the employer can clearly show associates are not using social media at 
                                                 
 353  See supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (comparing the similarities 
between the approved policy language and the unlawful policy and concluding the GC’s 
analysis applies to both provisions). 
 354  See supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (showing GC should have 
applied the same conclusion to the approved policy and the unlawful policy because the 
provisions are substantially similar).  
 355  See supra text accompanying notes 53, 60, 85–86 (showing the GC’s general 
test for social media and the GC’s conclusion regarding a substantially similar provision 
warranted a conclusion the approved policy was unlawful). 
 356  See supra notes 77, 239 and accompanying text (stating that the approved 
policy prohibits the use of social media during work and the Supreme Court and other state 
court cases have stated a clear robust policy may help to confine an employee’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy).  
 357  See supra text accompanying notes 53, 236 (providing the test used in Quon 
and other state court cases to determine whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
 358  See supra text accompanying notes 238, 249 (stating the Supreme Court 
recognizes many employers at least tolerate personal internet use and the GC further 
recognizes employees’ regular use of social media). 
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work, the policy will fail.359 The employer should have acknowledged most 
employees use social media and prescribed its use. 
 
C. Employers May Rely on the Approved Policy as a Template, But Must 
Not Adopt it Without Giving Consideration to its Limitations. 
 
Employers must tailor the approved policy and not merely supplant 
the policy’s boilerplate language. First, employers must evaluate the 
operational realities within their own state or industry, consider off-duty 
protection statutes and social media statutes when applicable, and clearly 
notify employees of how a policy is monitored and enforced to constrain 
employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy. 360  Second, the GC’s 
inconsistency in his analysis of specific provisions undermines the validity 
and reliability of many of the approved policy provisions and requires 
employers to return to the GC’s general test for guidance. 361  Third, 
employers cannot reasonably expect the approved policy to remain current, 
as clearly illustrated by the recent and pending enactment of social media 
legislation and agencies’ increased attention on the impact of social media on 
product endorsements, insider trading, and protected concerted activity.362 
This is a growing area of law and any social media policy will require 
regular revisions to remain current and lawful. Finally, employers need to 
conduct a reasonable investigation before terminating an employee for his or 
her online postings that relate to the terms and conditions of employment to 
prevent against allegations of unlawful terminations.363 The GC’s approved 
policy is a suitable template and can act as a checklist for employers when 
drafting or revising a social media policy after employers acknowledge the 
approved policy’s limitations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 359  See supra text accompanying note 245 (explaining the social media policy 
must mirror the operational realities of the workplace; otherwise, the employer risks the policy 
being nullified). 
 360  See supra text accompanying notes 227–230, 234–235 (requiring social media 
policies to reflect the operational realities of the workplace and describing legislation that may 
impact social media policies). 
 361  See supra notes 60, 63–64, 71, 85–86 and accompanying text (quoting the 
relevant lawful and unlawful policy language); see supra text accompanying notes 94–98, 
101–102, 178–180 (comparing a variety of provisions previously reviewed by the GC). 
 362  See supra text accompanying notes 185–186, 203–206, 210 (identifying 
ambiguities in the interaction between social media and employment law social media 
policies).  
 363  See supra text accompanying notes 48, 237 (inferring that changes in society 
may change an employee’s reasonable expectations of privacy when monitoring and enforcing 
a policy). 
49
Considine: Workplace Social Media Policies
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
566 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
 
1. The Approved Policy was Drafted for a National Retail Organization 
and is Not Suitable for Single-State Businesses or Small to Medium Multi-
State Businesses. 
 
The approved policy does not adequately address the needs of local 
businesses, single-state enterprises, or other industries. The approved policy 
is limited in its application to every business because the policy was drafted 
and tailored to a specific industry, a national retail organization. 364  For 
example, single-state companies need to re-draft their social media 
provisions to consider state law such as off-duty protection statutes, 
termination for good cause, anti-bullying statutes, or social media statutes.365 
The policy also does not appropriately address the social media needs of 
financial institutions or hospitals.366 Hospitals must incorporate social media 
provisions addressing HIPAA and notifying employees they are subject to 
termination for posts suggesting appropriate medical care will not be 
provided when necessary, both of which are not covered in the approved 
policy. 367  Financial institutions must provide a more detailed discussion 
about financial disclosure laws and what types of conduct violates insider 
trading laws because the Federal Bureau of Investigation recently announced 
that a dedicated taskforce will search social media websites in an effort to 
ferret out insider trading violations. 368  Employers cannot rely on the 
approved policy to adequately address every company’s needs and, therefore, 
employers are encouraged to rely on experts within the employment industry 
to help tailor the approved policy to the employer’s specific industry and 
needs. 
 
2. The GC Provides Employers with Some Reliable Tools by Consistently 
Highlighting the Importance of Limiting Language and Emphasizing His 
Continued Rejection of a Savings Clause. 
  
The approved social media policy demonstrates the GC’s consistent 
reliance on limiting language to clarify any ambiguities within the policy and 
                                                 
 364  See supra text accompanying note 47 (identifying Wal-Mart as the company 
that drafted the policy). 
 365  See supra text accompanying notes 227–231 (identifying additional 
considerations employers need to take into account before implementing the policy). 
 366  See supra text accompanying notes 129–130, 203 (identifying additional 
considerations, including financial disclosure and issues specific to the health care industry). 
 367  See supra text accompanying notes 129–130 (discussing the GC’s decision that 
drafting disparaging posts suggesting appropriate medical care may not be rendered is not 
protected concerted activity). 
 368  See supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that the FBI created a 
dedicated task force to ferret out insider trading violations). 
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the GC’s continued rejection of a savings clause.369 The GC’s approval of a 
policy that heavily relies on limiting language clearly demonstrates to 
employers the importance of using limiting language to clarify any 
ambiguities within the policy. 370  Based on the GC’s continued focus on 
limiting language in his three memos and the approval of a policy with 
plenty of limiting language, employers should infer the GC will favorably 
review policies utilizing sufficiently limiting language to qualify vague terms 
in an employment policy. 371  Along similar lines, the GC’s continued 
rejection and the GC’s subsequent approval of a policy without a savings 
clause means employers must not incorporate a savings clause into their 
social media policy, regardless of whether its purpose is boilerplate language 
or to cure policy ambiguities.372 The GC’s consistent analysis in the area of 
limiting language and disapproval of a savings clause provides employers 
reliable guidance on curing social media policy deficiencies.373  
 
3. Employers Must Look to the GC’s General Test as Guidance When the 
GC is Inconsistent in His Analysis or When the Approved Policy Provision 
is Overly Broad.   
 
The GC’s inconsistency in evaluations and conclusions related to 
provisions attempting to restrict employees from posting confidential 
information makes drafting a lawful provision difficult. Employers must 
instead rely on the GC’s test for social media policies to effectively draft a 
provision to prohibit insider trading by using limiting language to exclude 
protected concerted activity.374 Also, when selecting the necessary limiting 
language, employers cannot select vague terms, such as “company 
performance,” “contract,” or “internal business communications,” to define 
terms like “confidential” or “material information” because those terms are 
reasonably construed to encompass terms and conditions of employment.375 
                                                 
 369  See supra text accompanying notes 113–118 (discussing the GC’s continued 
rejection of savings clauses and the fact that a lack of a saving clause in the approved policy 
means the GC disapproves of savings clauses). 
 370  See supra notes 60–61, 67, 71 and accompanying text (detailing the limiting 
language used in the approved policy provisions). 
 371  See supra text accompanying notes 60–61, 71, 91–98, 101–102, 120–127  
(reviewing the GC’s analysis of overly broad policies and inferring the GC requires limiting 
language). 
 372  See supra text accompanying notes 113–118 (inferring that the emphasis on 
limiting language and the rejection of savings clauses suggest the GC only wants limiting 
language to cure a policy’s ambiguities). 
 373  See supra text accompanying notes 60–61, 71, 91–98, 101–102, 113–118, 120–
127 (showing the GC’s consistent analysis throughout all the GC memos as it relates to the 
GC’s emphasis on limiting language and rejection of a savings clause). 
 374  See supra text accompanying notes 52–53 (describing the GC’s general test for 
a social media policy). 
 375  See supra text accompanying notes 94–97 (explaining the terms used are 
overly broad and include protected concerted activity). 
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The GC requires clear, robust limiting language to restrict the terms 
“material” or “confidential” information.376 Employers, for example, could 
meet the GC’s test for limiting language by stating:  
 
Employees must maintain the confidentiality of the 
employer’s material non-public information. Material non-
public information includes providing a tip based on inside 
information for the purchase and sale of securities. Material 
non-public information does not include employees’ 
protected discussions about the terms and conditions of 
employment, collective bargaining agreements, or union 
activities.377 
 
The GC’s inconsistency highlights the importance of tailoring any insider 
trading policy provision rather than adopting the approved policy provision 
verbatim.  
The GC is inconsistent in his evaluation and conclusions related to 
complete accuracy in online postings.378 The GC failed to analyze why the 
approved policy’s command of accuracy is lawful; therefore, employers must 
rely on the GC’s general test for social media policies to draft an appropriate 
provision.379 Employers should encourage, rather than require, employees to 
post only accurate and honest information because “encourage” connotes a 
lower standard than “require,” and therefore is not reasonably construed to 
prohibit concerted activity.380 In addition, employers must notify employees 
they are only subject to discipline or termination for statements that are 
maliciously false because employees do not receive protection under the 
NLRA for maliciously false statements. 381  Thus, a lawful provision will 
state:  
                                                 
 376  See supra text accompanying 94–97, 191–195, 201–202 (inferring that the 
policy’s attempt to incorporate limiting language is not sufficiently clear to exclude protected 
concerted activity and other policies governing confidential information are overly broad). 
 377  See supra text accompanying notes 53,72, 96–97, 138–143, 147–154, 190, 194, 
201 (citing the GC’s general test for a social media policy requiring limiting language and a 
couple of sample cases that demonstrate the importance of notifying employees that only 
certain activity is protected because not all employee discussions involve protected concerted 
activity). 
 378  See supra text accompanying notes 61, 101–103 (inferring the GC is 
inconsistent because the GC approved a provision requiring accuracy and honesty in the 
approved policy, but deemed a substantially similar provision unlawful).   
 379  See supra text accompanying notes 47, 52–53 (referencing the approved social 
media policy’s failure to disclose why the approved provision is lawful and highlighting the 
GC’s general social media test). 
 380  See supra text accompanying note 102 (explaining the GC invalidates policies 
requiring honesty and accuracy because, without sufficiently limiting language, the policies 
embrace protected concerted activity). 
 381  See supra text accompanying notes 53, 102 (explaining that comments 
amounting to maliciously false statements are not protected by the NLRA).  
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Employees are prohibited from making statements on behalf 
of the employer unless authorized. Employees making 
statements about their personal beliefs or opinions on social 
media websites are encouraged to be honest and accurate, 
but employees will be subject to discipline, including 
termination, for maliciously false statements or posts about a 
person’s sex, creed, religion, or disability that contribute to a 
hostile work environment.382  
 
Employers must recognize that the GC’s inconsistency in analysis related to 
the accuracy and honesty provisions means the approved policy’s honesty 
and accuracy provision is suspicious and warrants revision before 
implementation. 
The GC is also inconsistent in his analysis of provisions 
recommending employees use internal policy procedures to resolve work 
related disputes. 383  Employers clearly cannot explicitly require that 
employees use internal procedures to resolve disputes because this violates 
the first prong of the GC’s test as an explicit restriction on protected 
concerted activities. 384  The GC is inconsistent when evaluating whether 
provisions encouraging the use of internal procedures are reasonably 
construed to encompass protected concerted activity and, therefore, whether 
employers should instead draft provisions with some derivative of the term 
“suggest” because the term is arguably weaker when compared to drafting 
terms such as “recommend” or “encourage.”385 The weaker language cannot 
reasonably be construed to preclude or inhibit employees from pursuing 
protected concerted activity on alternative forums, like social media, because 
a suggestion does not connote penalties, but rather advice that may be freely 
taken or discarded. 386  Just like other inconsistent opinions by the GC, 
employers must recognize the GC’s inconsistent analysis makes the GC’s 
                                                 
 382  See supra text accompanying notes 52–53, 68, 102, 221 (inferring from the 
GC’s test and other policy provisions that an employer may lawfully forbid an employee from 
making statements on behalf of the employer without authorization. Further, the GC prevented 
employers from requiring complete honesty and accuracy, but the GC reasoned in other policy 
provisions that maliciously false statements or egregious comments are not protected or 
reasonably considered to be part of protected concerted activity so there should be limiting 
language in a policy provision). 
 383  See supra notes 60, 85–86 and accompanying text (comparing the policy 
provisions to demonstrate the GC’s inconsistency). 
 384  See supra text accompanying notes 52, 86–87 (stating that the GC applies the 
first part of the analysis to invalidate provisions requiring employees to utilize internal 
procedures over posting criticisms online, but the GC states an employer may suggest the 
employees use internal procedures rather than social media). 
 385  See supra text accompanying note 85–86 (explaining an employer may suggest 
an employee use internal procedures, while invalidating a provision that used the term 
“encourage”). 
 386  See supra text accompanying note 86 (stating that an employer may “suggest” 
employee actions). 
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approval of the social media provision suspicious, and employers must test 
any policy provision against the GC’s general test for social media 
policies.387 
Finally, the GC acknowledged that some of the approved provisions 
are overly broad without the use of limiting language.388 For example, the 
GC stated that “Be Respectful” is overly broad without the limiting language 
and, therefore, any effort to tailor the approved policy by revising the 
limiting language must be carefully reviewed to ensure the new language 
meets the GC’s test for social media policies.389  If an employer fails to 
reevaluate the revised policy provision after editing the limiting language, 
the employer risks the GC classifying the provision as overly broad because 
employees may reasonably construe the policy as encompassing protected 
concerted activity.390   
 
4. A Social Media Policy Needs to Notify Employees How the Policy is 
Enforced and How the Approved Policy is Limited in its Guidance to 
Employers. 
 
The approved policy is limited in its application to every business 
because the approved policy does not reflect the operational realities of most 
employers. 391  The approved policy fails to notify employees of how the 
policy is enforced and only reflects the operational realities of a particular 
organization; therefore, it needs to be tailored to the organizational structure 
of each business.392 Small businesses need to evaluate the expense involved 
with monitoring and enforcing a prohibition on social media. 393  Small 
businesses may find it more cost-effective to allow the use of social media 
during work hours because allowing social media eliminates the expense of 
monitoring employees. 394  The downside of allowing social media means 
                                                 
 387  See supra text accompanying notes 52–53, 60, 86–87 (referencing the GC’s 
general social media test in light of the inconsistent analysis of the approved and unlawful 
policy provision). 
 388  See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (stating the policy is overly broad 
but the limiting language saves the provision).  
 389  See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 (stating the policy is overly broad 
but the limiting language saves the provision and prevents a reasonable employee from 
interpreting the language to prohibit protected concerted activity). 
 390  See supra text accompanying notes 52–53 (suggesting that the GC’s general 
test deems policies unlawful that do not include sufficient limiting language to exclude 
protected concerted activity). 
 391  See supra text accompanying note 47 (stating the policy was drafted for a 
specific national retail organization). 
 392  See supra text accompanying notes 47, 234–235(inferring the policy does not 
identify how it is enforced or monitored).  
 393  See supra text accompanying notes 241–245, 252–254 (describing the costs 
involved with different approaches to monitoring). 
 394  See supra text accompanying note 252–252 (explaining that allowing social 
media eliminates some of the cost of monitoring and enforcement). 
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employees have a more reasonable expectation of privacy because the 
employer does not actively limit social media use. 395  However, some 
companies may elect to proscribe the use of social media during working 
hours because there is sufficient revenue to cover the monitoring and 
enforcement expenses.396 Regardless of the policy adopted, employers must 
draft a clear and robust policy to restrict employees’ reasonable expectations 
of privacy in the event the employer conducts work-related investigations for 
misconduct.397 Thus, it is important for the employer to notify employees 
about the monitoring system and only implement a policy that reflects the 
operational realities of the business.398  
 
5. The Law Continues to Develop and the Approved Policy Does Not 
Address All the Important Areas of Law Employers Need to Consider, such 
as Unlawful Surveillance and What Constitutes Whistleblowing Online. 
 
Employers must continue to update their social media policies 
because the approved policy only reflects the GC’s current efforts to clarify 
the law as it relates to protected concerted activity. 399  However, many 
questions are left unresolved. 400  For example, the GC has not clarified 
whether an employer engages in unlawful surveillance if a post is available 
because the employer is a friend-of-a-friend, the employer engages in 
surveillance by following a Twitter user, or the employer finds the 
information on a publicly visible account. 401  When these issues become 
resolved, the employer may need to revise its social media policies to reflect 
the GC’s current interpretation and ensure the employer is not impinging on 
employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity. 402  Employers should 
refrain from asking employees or agents to view an employee’s Facebook or 
Twitter on behalf of the employer until the GC clarifies his interpretation of 
the law in these areas because such actions traditionally constitute unlawful 
                                                 
 395  See supra text accompanying note 239 (stating that a clear and robust policy 
shapes employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy and thus, a policy allowing social 
media will result in employees expecting a high degree of privacy). 
 396  See supra text accompanying notes 241–242 (detailing the costs involved in 
enforcing social media policies). 
 397  See supra text accompanying note 236 (encouraging employers to conduct an 
investigation before action). 
 398  See supra text accompanying notes 224, 257 (recommending to employers to 
provide a clear policy notifying employees how the policy is enforced and monitored). 
 399  See supra note 45 and accompanying text (citing the GC’s only three memos 
analyzing social media use in the employment context).  
 400  See supra text accompanying notes 184–186, 205, 227–230 (describing current 
ambiguities in the social media context). 
 401  See supra text accompanying note 184–186 (identifying these ambiguities in 
unlawful surveillance). 
 402  See supra text accompanying note 48 (reminding employers the approved 
policy is a template and drafting a social media policy requires a great deal of care). 
55
Considine: Workplace Social Media Policies
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
572 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
 
surveillance.403 Also, an employer is advised to reveal the source of any 
reported social media policy violations when disciplining or terminating an 
employee for his or her online conduct because not every employee’s social 
media settings are limited to “friends” only, and traditionally, an employer 
engaged in unlawful surveillance by failing to reveal its source.404  
Additionally, case law continues to develop in the area of 
whistleblowing and anti-retaliation, and the approved policy does not offer 
guidance for employers on this issue.405  Employers do not have a clear case 
to rely on to draft a policy provision, so whether a report of social media 
qualifies as whistleblowing or a report of bad conduct is uncertain.406 Until 
these issues are resolved, employers are encouraged to complete a full 
investigation on any potential whistleblowing or anti-retaliation conduct by 
an employee before taking any disciplinary action or terminating the 
employee.407 
 
6. Employers Must Conduct a Reasonable Investigation Before 
Terminating an Employee for Online Actions and the Employer Must 
Determine Whether the Posts are Reasonably Related to the Employment 
Terms and Conditions. 
 
Finally, the policy should notify employees that a reasonable 
investigation will be conducted before any employee is terminated for online 
posts related to employment terms and conditions.408 Employers may risk 
liability for terminating an employee over social media discussions with 
other co-workers because the posts may be employees working in concert for 
mutual aid and protection, but employers do not risk liability when the posts 
amount to personal gripes, egregious conduct, or actions for personal benefit 
because such conduct is not protected by the NLRA.409 Employers must 
reference the GC’s previous memos for guidance in differentiating between 
                                                 
 403  See supra text accompanying notes 131–133 (describing traditional actions 
amounting to unlawful surveillance). 
 404  See supra text accompanying notes 132, 160–170 (stating the general rule 
requires unlawful surveillance but, in some limited circumstances, the employer does not have 
to reveal its source when viewing the employee’s posts limited only to “friends” because the 
employee can reason a “friend” reported the postings to management). 
 405  See supra text accompanying note 205–206 (identifying an ambiguous area of 
the law related to whistleblowing and anti-retaliation).  
 406  See supra text accompanying note 205 (stating that no case law addresses 
whether a social media posting qualifies as a whistleblowing report). 
 407  See supra text accompanying note 206 (stating that employers are encouraged 
to conduct an investigation before termination). 
 408  See supra text accompanying note 48 (stating employers must investigate any 
violations of a social media policy). 
 409  See supra text accompanying notes 31–32, 137–170 (detailing the types of 
activities the NLRA protects and further describing three scenarios where the employee 
alleged he or she engaged in protected concerted activity so the employer needed to 
demonstrate the terminations were not in response to protected concerted activity). 
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protected and non-protected postings because an employer risks a court or 
the GC concluding the employee was unlawfully discharged.410 However, 
employers must remember the NLRA’s application to social media is just 
beginning, and the full parameters of that application have not been 
identified because the GC continues to review cases addressing social media 
in the employment context.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The approved policy is a useful resource for employers, but it should 
not be blindly implemented without additional considerations. 411  The 
approved policy provisions are lawful where the employer understands the 
current state of the law and drafts appropriate, limiting provisions. 412 
However, the approved policy contains many gaps, which employers must 
identify and correct before implementing the entire approved policy.413 For 
example, employers with single-state enterprises must identify whether their 
state has an off-duty protection statute, specific social media legislation, and 
other statutes protecting employees, such as good-cause termination or anti-
bullying statutes. 414  Further, employers must also correct the approved 
policy’s threat to employees, the GC’s inconsistencies, and be sure to draft 
policy language that clearly notifies employees how the policy is monitored 
and enforced. 415  While this comment provides policy language 
recommendations for specific social media provisions, in order to implement 
successful social media policies, employers must stay abreast of changes in 
                                                 
 410  See supra text accompanying note 45 (setting forth the GC’s three memos that 
give employers guidance on what types of conduct constitutes protected concerted activity). 
 411  See supra text accompanying notes 364–368 (arguing the approved policy was 
designed for a specific area and requires tailoring to each employer’s business). 
 412  See supra text accompanying notes 206–306 (arguing some of the approved 
policy provisions are lawful because of sufficiently limiting language, sufficiently meeting the 
FTC requirements, and not incorporating a savings clause). 
 413  See supra text accompanying notes 307–310 (articulating some of the failures 
of the approved policy). 
 414  See supra text accompanying notes 226–232, 311–330, 365 (describing the 
states with specific legislation, arguing the approved policy violates the statutory tests of off-
duty protection statutes, and reminding employers to consider state specific legislation when 
drafting their policy provisions). 
 415  See supra text accompanying notes 267–268, 308, 331–337 (arguing the 
approved policy contains a veiled threat to employees); see also supra 356–359, 391–398 
(arguing the approved policy fails because it doesn’t notify employees how the policy is 
enforced or monitored and recommending employers consider drafting language addressing 
how the policy is monitored and enforced within their social media policy); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 331–355, 374–387 (describing the GC’s inconsistency in his analysis and 
arguing the inconsistency may be corrected by careful analysis of previous memos). 
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the law, frequently update their social media policies, and always conduct a 
reasonable investigation before disciplining or terminating an employee.416  
  
 
 
 
                  
                                                 
 416  See supra text accompanying note 408–410 (arguing employers must conduct a 
reasonable investigation because the law continues to develop and there are still ambiguities in 
the law). 
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